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15 January 2026

MANUAL FOR THE JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL AND THE JOINT FORCE REQUIREMENTS PROCESS

JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318

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CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MANUAL

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MANUAL FOR THE JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL AND THE JOINT FORCE REQUIREMENTS PROCESS

References:
See Enclosure F

1. Purpose. This manual provides detailed guidance on implementing the Joint Force Requirements Process (JFRP) and enabling the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) to fulfill its statutory responsibilities to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) under reference (a), as outlined in reference (b).

2. Superseded/Cancellation

a. The "Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System," 30 October 2021 is hereby canceled.

b. Previously validated JROC requirements remain validated, and previously signed JROC Memorandums (JROCM) remain in effect. Requirements sponsors may request relief from JROCM tasks and comebacks through the Joint Staff Directorate for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment, J-8 Deputy Director for Requirements and Capability Development (DDRCD).

2. Manual Sections. This manual is organized into the following major sections:

a. Enclosure A outlines procedures to enable the JROC to execute Joint Force Design (JFD), Joint Capability Integration (JCI), and Combatant Command (CCMD) Requirements through a lens of Joint Operational Problems (JOPs) underpinned by Capability Portfolio Management (CPM) and other analytic efforts.

b. Enclosure B delineates administrative processes for the JROC and the JFRP.

c. Enclosure C. provides guidance and formatting for all Joint Force Requirements (JFR) documents required for the JFRP.

d. Enclosure D provides an overview of various supporting aspects of the JFRP, including Joint Capability Areas (JCAs), metrics, digital tools, and training.

e. Enclosure E provides an overview of the multiple parallel Service, component, interagency, and international processes that work in concert with and support the JFRP and the JROC.

4. Applicability. This instruction applies to the Joint Staff, Military Services, National Guard Bureau, CCMDs, Defense Agencies and Field Activities (DAFAs), Combat Support Agencies, and all other organizational entities within the Department of War (DoW). This document refers to the former as "Services and components."

5. Procedures. See Enclosures A through E

6. Summary of Changes. Based on reference (c) and changes in responsibilities and authorities in reference (a), the JCIDS Manual is rescinded in its entirety, and reference (b) has been updated and reissued. Reference (b) and this manual fundamentally change the Joint Requirements process, removing the validation of Service- and component-level requirements and reorienting the JROC to focus on JFD, JCI, and CCMD requirements through a lens of JOPs underpinned by CPM.

7. Releasability. UNRESTRICTED. This instruction is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited on the Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET). DoW components (to include the CCMDs) and other Federal agencies may obtain copies of this directive through the Internet from the CJCS Directives Electronic Library at <https://dod365.sharepoint-mil.us/sites/JS-Matrix-DEL/SitePages/Home.aspx>. Joint Staff activities may also obtain access via the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) Electronic Library web sites.

8. Effective Date. This MANUAL is effective upon signature. The first planned revision of this manual is 1 year after publication. Subsequent revisions will be every 2 years.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

C. J. MAHONEY, Gen, USMC
Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Enclosures:

A – JROC Focus Areas and Process
B – JROC and JFRP Administrative Processes & Guidance
C – JFRP Requirements Documentation
D – JFRP Miscellaneous Supporting Processes & Tools
E – JROC and JFRP Parallel Processes
F – References

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ENCLOSURE A

JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL
FOCUS AREAS AND PROCESS

1. Joint Requirements and Resourcing Theory of Victory

a. The DoW is implementing a fundamental transformation of how the DoW identifies operational problems, develops requirements, and delivers capabilities to warfighters. As directed by reference (c), the JFRP creates a direct path from joint warfighter needs to fielded solutions.

b. First, the JROC will be reoriented to identify and annually rank JOPs and enumerate associated Concept-Required Capabilities (CRCs). This short, focused list of JOPs becomes the single authoritative joint demand signal driving analysis, experimentation, and budgeting decisions across the DoW. The JROC focuses strategic attention on important problems that require joint solutions, while Services move at their own speed on Service-specific capabilities.

c. The Requirements and Resourcing Alignment Board (RRAB) will align fiscal resources to JROC-prioritized JOPs during the Program Budget Review (PBR) process. Reviewing the list of JOPs, the RRAB selects problems annually for deep-dive analysis and funding allocation. By exception, the RRAB may recommend modification or termination of component activities that conflict with joint priorities.

d. The Mission Engineering and Integration Activity (MEIA) will conduct mission engineering, iterative experimentation and assessments, and operational integration against the selected prioritized JOPs. The MEIA will translate JOPs into clear technical sub-components, engage industry early and continuously, and generate evidence of the effectiveness of solution elements through analysis and testing. MEIA will recommend validated solutions with evidence-based products and provide integration and interoperability support to inform RRAB resourcing decisions.

e. Beginning with the fiscal year (FY) 2027 budget cycle, the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) will implement the Joint Acceleration Reserve (JAR) as a deliberate topline reserve created in fiscal guidance and will place funding for joint requirements solutions into Service execution lines across the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). This dedicated funding mechanism aims to address the persistent “valley of death” problem and incentivizes cross-Service participation in joint solution development. JAR-funded lines will be internally tagged across the FYDP to

ensure transparency, enable congressional buy-in, and prevent exploiting process loopholes.

f. Lastly, Services will execute with greater speed and autonomy, fielding capabilities without waiting for joint validation while sharing approved requirements documents and program data with Joint Staff and other key stakeholders to maintain joint awareness, ensure an integrated and interoperable joint force, and enable portfolio trades. This transparency ensures the Joint Staff maintains visibility for statutorily required assessments and Joint Force Development and Design (JFDD) activities without creating new review layers.

g. This transformation represents more than process reform. It establishes a new operating model where strategy drives priorities, priorities drive resources, and resources drive capability delivery in a continuous, synchronized motion. The JROC identifies what matters most in the form of JOPs. Analytic products from the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of War (OSW) (e.g., CAPE, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (OUSW(R&E)), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (OUSW(A&S)) help inform major resourcing decisions that will deliver advantage to the future Joint Force. Clear prioritization and knowledge of future funding availability will unleash innovation and investment from industry. MEIA will proactively identify, analyze, and experiment to prove what works and drive integration and interoperability to address JOPs for the Joint Force. The RRAB ensures the most impactful solution elements get funded. Services execute at speed and own pieces of priority missions.

h. In alignment with reference (c), every element of this process must meet a simple test: are we accelerating the delivery of integrated capabilities to solve our most pressing operational problems? Organizations and processes that advance this goal will be strengthened. Those that impede it will be reformed or realigned.

i. Success occurs when the DoW routinely resolves the Joint Force's hardest operational problems with funded and interoperable capabilities within a single budget cycle. The JROC prioritizes the problems, CPM supports detailed cross-functional analysis, MEIA validates innovative solutions, the RRAB allocates the resources, and the Services field capabilities at the speed of relevance.

2. Intent and Guiding Principles of the JFRP and JROC

a. The JFRP replaced the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) due to numerous, well-documented, failures (see references (e) and (f)). In reorienting the JROC and reforming the joint requirements process, the JROC Chair identified the following first principles to underpin reform efforts as well as future JROC execution:

(1) Deliver capability to the warfighters at speed. Cut red tape. Accelerate the delivery of capabilities that meet the operational needs of the warfighters and remove bureaucratic barriers.

(2) Preserve the independent warfighter voice. Provide warfighters an independent and direct role to ensure that capabilities meet their needs.

(3) Ensure alignment from strategy to budget with analytic due diligence. Establish a clear, unbroken link from strategic guidance, to concepts, to capabilities and budgeting. Apply data-based analytics for requirements, acquisition, and budgeting decision making.

(4) Drive Joint Force design, development, and integration in four dimensions:

(a) Integrate globally across the CCMDs. Enable CJCS's global integration role by addressing warfighter needs across regions and across allies and partners (A&P).

(b) Balance near-term and future (beyond FYDP) needs. Balance the urgency of immediate needs with longer-term strategic investments.

(c) Support the breadth of existing innovative technologies and major programs regardless of acquisitions pathway. Support the entire spectrum of capabilities—from commercial innovation to complex, large-scale defense programs—through flexible and tailored approaches.

(d) Address all elements of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTmLPF-P). Deliver holistic solutions to warfighters considering all elements of DOTmLPF-P.

(5) Align authorities to responsibilities and ensure accountability. Ensure that capability developers have the authority to execute and are held accountable for outcomes.

3. Joint Operational Problems

a. Definition. In accordance with (IAW) reference (a), JOPs are "a challenge across the joint force in achieving an assigned military objective based on current doctrine, emerging threats, or future concepts." JOPs are the most pressing challenges to the current and future Joint Force, which, if left unaddressed, create significant risk to the Joint Force. Stated another way, JOPs describe a condition or situation that resists, obstructs, or prevents the Joint Force's ability to achieve an assigned objective or task. JOPs articulate current and future warfighter problems the Joint Force needs to be solved from an integrated joint perspective. JOPs do not specify solutions.

b. Purpose. The JROC prioritizes JOPs to:

(1) Enable JFDD activities—including development of joint warfighting concepts (JWCs), joint supporting concepts, and CRCs, as well as integration of Service force designs—across a common mission, time horizon, and threat.

(2) Design and assess variations of future operational missions, capabilities and concepts, and force structure against JOPs.

(3) Focus analytical efforts to explicitly link capability development to overcoming the most pressing Joint Force operational challenges.

(4) Align capability development and requirements management activities, including CPM and CCMD requirements prioritization.

(5) Communicate the Joint Force's most pressing problems and integrate with parallel acquisition and resourcing functions and forums, including MEIA and RRAB.

(6) Ensure JFRP alignment to strategic guidance and direction. It is the responsibility of the JROC to ensure JOPs are aligned to *National Defense Strategy* (NDS)-directed Key Operational Problems (KOPs).

c. Identification. The JROC—inclusive of the Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) in their role as ad hoc JROC members—identifies and prioritizes the top JOPs based on strategic guidance, including NDS KOPs, JWC KOPs, CCMD Integrated Priority Lists (IPLs), and threat analysis, as well as ongoing Joint Force design activities. The OPRs for JOP identification and prioritization are the Joint Staff J-7 Joint Experimentation and Concept Implementation/Force Development and Design Execution Division and Joint Staff J-8 Joint Capabilities Division (JCD), assisted by the CCMDs, Services, and OSW.

d. Prioritization. The JROC prioritizes JOPs annually to drive JFDD, industry engagements through the MEIA, and resourcing decisions through the RRAB. The JROC evaluates and prioritizes joint operational problems based on:

(1) Strategic guidance.

(2) CCMD requirements.

(3) Intelligence Community (IC) assessments.

(4) Joint Force design and concepts.

(5) CPM assessments and recommendations.

(6) Readiness Assessments.

e. Additional Elements of a JOP. The JFRP will use a standard set of elements to articulate each JOP. These elements provide a common framework to support the JFRP, RRAB, MEIA, CPM, and other DoW-wide efforts.

(1) Mission Definition. The strategic objective, as well as the operational mission and measure of success the Joint Force must achieve. Includes scenarios/ vignettes that describe the geographical or operational environment.

(2) Time Epoch. The timeframe to which the JOP applies. The epoch links the problem to strategic guidance, future concepts, and capabilities.

(3) Threat. A description of the adversary planned operations and capabilities for the JOP.

(4) Classification Level. JOPs will be disseminated at the most appropriate classification level, as identified by the Original Classification Authority (OCA); at minimum, a SECRET-level description will be provided to enable MEIA to engage effectively with industry partners.

4. Joint Force Design

a. The Joint Staff maintains the JWC and/or future artifacts associated with JFDD activities and helps frame concise, threat-specific JOPs emerging from strategic guidance, threat evolution, and CCMD inputs. The Joint Staff packages these into JOPs and CRCs with supporting analysis. The JROC prioritizes JOPs annually, with the top problems selected for supporting

analysis by CPM, which integrates appropriate stakeholders from across the DoW in a task-organized manner. JROC prioritization is intended to drive cross-Service focus to Joint Force needs and priorities. The ranked list acts as the equivalent of a "user story backlog" in software development, with top problems receiving attention for analysis and/or funding. The overall goal is to create a clear, consistent joint demand signal that persists across budget cycles, and expresses joint military needs to the DoW and industrial base, so that the DoW can make progress against its most important problems and gaps.

b. IAW reference (g), to effectively realize a future Joint Force DoW must consider the continuum of the force over three consecutive epochs: near-term (0–2 years), mid-term (2–7 years), and long term (7–25 years). For clarity, when this manual references Force Employment, it refers to the near-term efforts; Joint Force Development refers to the mid-term efforts; and Joint Force Design refers to the long-term efforts.

c. JFRP supports the JROC in maintaining a long-term, strategic outlook intended to shape the future Joint Force. Designing the future Joint Force includes altering the operational missions the force is meant to achieve; the capabilities and concepts the force employs to support strategic objectives; and the structure of the force as expressed by manpower, materiel, and organization at the Service and departmental levels. JFD reconciles strategic guidance with future concepts and capabilities required to accomplish the mission beyond current Force Employment and Force Development efforts. The JROC assesses an array of force packages and configurations, operational concepts, and new capabilities against a variety of scenarios—including, but not limited to, the Office of the Under Secretary of War for Policy-produced Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS)—and adversary dispositions to develop a Joint Force oriented on optionality, enabling multiple methods to solve JOPs. Assessing Service force design contributions to resolving prioritized JOPs is critical to long-term efforts.

d. Reference (g) remains the authoritative source for implementing JFDD, particularly regarding the development of training, education, and concepts to support JFD. JFD within the JFRP is primarily focused on ensuring that the missions, capabilities, concepts, and structure of the future Joint Force are sufficient to maintain and expand competitive advantages against potential enemies.

e. One key output of the JFRP is to provide coherent and comprehensive force design recommendations for the CJCS to assist the President and Secretary of War (SecWar) in providing strategic direction for the Armed Forces, as prescribed in reference (h). Successfully accomplishing this process will

support CJCS's military advice to SecWar, and can be referenced by the Services and the Joint Staff. The JFD will be prepared by the Joint Staff, in collaboration with the Services/components, and inform the Chairman's Program Recommendation (CPR) and Chairman's Risk Assessment (CRA) each year.

f. The JFD process is continuous and iterative and has many similarities with CPM logic flow, identifying gaps, solutions, trade space, and recommendations. JFD aggregates Service and component force designs and evaluates against requirements in the NDS and JOPs, and requirements for joint interoperability and integration. JFD identifies deficiencies in the Joint Force and enables recommendations to produce a holistic JFD, as opposed to the simple combination of individual Service force designs.

g. JFD consists of six steps: Conceptualization, Gap Identification, Solutions Identification, Solutions Assessments, Trade-Space Analysis, and Recommendations.

(1) Conceptualization. The first step in JFD is divided in three parts. It begins with analyzing relevant strategic guidance, including the NDS and its supporting KOPs, Force Planning Construct as instantiated in the *Defense Planning Guidance* and DPS, as well as the *National Military Strategy* (NMS) and joint warfighting concepts. Using that information, the JROC will identify and prioritize JOPs against which the JFD will be assessed. The final part is to use the information learned from the analysis of strategic guidance and prioritizing JOPS to identify the capabilities required for the Joint Force's long-term, strategic success—particularly in light of our adversary's ways of war.

(2) Gap Identification. The second step of JFD is identifying gaps that the future Joint Force will have in executing the missions identified in step one, particularly if current Service and JFDD efforts are not altered. To be successful, the Services must regularly update the JROC on their current Service Force Development and Design (FDD) efforts. The aggregation of individual Service force design efforts will be assessed against capabilities required to meet applicable requirements in the NDS and other strategic guidance and JROC-prioritized JOPs in a variety of threat-informed scenarios.

(3) Solutions Identification. The third step of JFD is identifying potential solutions to the identified gaps in JFD. Solutions identification should support the holistic development of capabilities and not be restricted to identifying materiel solutions for capability or capacity gaps. This process includes analyzing suitable, feasible, and acceptable solutions across the DOTmLPF-P spectrum required to fully address gaps and shortfalls—including, but not

limited to, altering current missions, developing new concepts, and/or developing new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to ensure NDS requirements, JOPs, and/or joint interoperability requirements are adequately addressed.

(4) Solutions Assessments. The fourth step of JFD assesses the solutions identified against the most challenging JOPs. The goal of this assessment is to identify those combinations of capabilities and formations that provide the Joint Force with optionality, flexibility, and agility to respond to our Nation's future operational challenges. The framework to assess solutions to JOPs must explicitly link to the required capabilities and allow decision makers to explore a variety of force packages to overcome particular problem sets. This entails assessing a variety of force configurations or force packages against various scenarios or enemy force dispositions.

(5) Trade-Space Analysis. The fifth step of JFD entails the comparison of potential force packages and configurations, assessing the risks to mission, risk to force, risks in acquisition, affordability, and budgetary risks of each in order to develop a detailed list of recommendations for the Joint Force. The Solution Assessments and Trade-Space Analysis steps should consider how well capabilities can be adapted, extended, or updated to address more than one JOP.

(6) Recommendations. The final step in the JFD process is providing recommendations to the CJCS, which may include an updated JFD, refined JOPs, and clear JFRs. These recommendations identify the gaps and solutions both in terms of capability and capacity that the future Joint Force needs to meet applicable requirements in the NDS and other strategic guidance and address JROC-prioritized JOPs. The recommendations will identify capabilities and constructs that require additional investment, maintenance of current investment levels, or divestment. This will inform the CRA, CPR, and other strategic documentation.

5. Joint Capability Integration

a. The JROC's mission, as defined in reference (a), includes the authority and responsibility to continuously review and assess military capabilities of the Services and components; identify and prioritize gaps and opportunities in joint military capabilities, including making recommendations for changes to address capability and capacity gaps; and recommend joint capability requirements that ensure system interoperability between joint military capabilities.

b. In support of the above authorities and responsibilities, the JROC will conduct JCI to:

(1) Maintain and provide awareness of Service/component programs with joint dependencies.

(2) Assess and manage second and third order impacts and interdependencies of Service/component-level decisions.

(3) Promote integration and interoperability while avoiding unintended duplication.

(4) Identify the most critical joint attributes that need to be captured to inform acquisition trade-space decisions.

(5) Recommend changes, alternatives, or cancellation of struggling programs with joint impacts.

(6) Ensure Service/component program information is appropriately incorporated into JROC analysis, including CPM and JFD.

c. The JROC will conduct JCI via Initial and By Exception reviews. Initial reviews will involve the "push" of recently approved Service/component requirements documents for JROC review and recommendations; By Exception reviews will involve the "pull" of previously approved requirements documentation for JROC review when issues arise.

d. JCI will not impede the Service/component requirements or acquisition process. The JROC will not act as a gatekeeper nor will it validate Service/component requirements. JCI differs from the legacy JCIDS system in several key dimensions, as summarized in Table 1.

	JCIDS	JCI
Validation	Service/component requirements validated by the JROC.	JROC ceases validation of Service/component requirements. JROC only reviews Service/component documentation post-Service/component approval.
Documentation	Prescribed standardized document formats. Documents rejected based on formatting or content issues.	Leverages Service/component document formats. Specifies only the minimum information required for JCI. Provides broad guidance for joint requirements documents, focused on content over format.
Comment Adjudication	Significant effort required to fully adjudicate JROC stakeholders' critical and substantive comments. Consensus-based decision making incentivized.	Information only commenting significantly reduces sponsor comment adjudication time. Encourages productively adversarial debate.
Certifications/ Endorsements	Mandated 6-8 certifications/endorsements, depending on document type, requiring significant time to complete for document sponsors.	Provides guidance, coordination, and support related to performance attributes and certifications/endorsements. With only 1–2 exceptions, defers certifications/endorsements to Services/components to complete IAW relevant law and policy.
Delegation	JROC and JCB validate all requirements upon completion of JCIDS process. * * J-8/DDRCD has delegated validation authority for JUONs.	Requirements review and approval delegated to the lowest possible level, including FCB level. Increased flexibility to change JSDs to ensure appropriate levels of awareness.
Timeline	JCIDS nominal timelines listed at 40–100 days. Actual timelines assessed at approximately 300 days on average for completion.	JFRP nominal timelines set at 55 business days. Actual timelines to be determined.

Table 1. JCIDS and JCI Comparison Table

6. JCI: Initial Review of Service/Component Requirements

a. IAW reference (i), all approved Service/component requirements documents will be submitted in Knowledge Management/Decision Support (KM/DS) by the requirements sponsor to the Joint Requirements Coordinator (JRC) for Joint Staffing Designator (JSD) assignment and follow the JFRP staffing process.

b. Services/components will use Service/component document formats. However, the JFRP requires Service/components to submit a minimum amount of information for JCI. That submission will contain the following items:

(1) Operational Context

(a) Joint and/or Service/component task.

(b) Concept of operation (CONOPS)/concept of employment (CONEMP).

(2) Threat/Intelligence. Service Intelligence Center/Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)-approved Threat Assessment.

(a) Critical Intelligence Parameters (CIPs).

(b) Intelligence Supportability.

(3) Requirements

(a) Capability Requirements (CRs) and/or Performance Attributes.

(b) Traceability to joint and/or Service/component requirements and gaps.

(c) Technological Readiness Levels (TRLs) and Manufacturing Readiness Levels (MRLs).

(d) Projected cost, schedule, and quantity.

(4) Joint Integration

(a) Impacts to joint and/or Service FDD.

(b) Joint Interoperability.

(c) Inter-Service dependencies and capabilities provided.

(d) DOTmLPF-P Impacts.

c. After review of the Service/component requirements, the JROC or subordinate board will sign and publish a JROCM. The JROCM will:

(1) Endorse all, some, or none of the Service/component requirements document as a JFR.

(2) Identify any issues that impact JFDD.

(3) Identify critical Joint Capability Requirements (JCRs) to inform Warfighting Acquisition System (WAS) trade-space decisions.

(4) Establish tripwires and comebacks.

(5) Make recommendations, provide guidance and direction, or direct additional analysis related to joint implications.

(6) Capture the final position of Services and components, with dissenting opinions as appropriate.

(7) Forward recommendations and endorsements to appropriate boards for action, including Service/component requirements/acquisition boards, as well as the RRAB.

7. JCI: Initial Review of Special Operations Forces Capabilities Integration and Development System and Cyber Capabilities Integration and Development System Requirements

a. The JROC integrates with the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), which possess unique authorities for requirements generation and validation. While USSOCOM and USCYBERCOM retain validation authority for specific subsets of requirements documents, the JROC will maintain awareness of these validated requirements through JCI. The JRC will work to ensure appropriate integration of the JFRP and Special Operations Forces Capabilities Integration and Development System (SOFCIDS) and Cyber Capabilities Integration and Development System (CCIDS), including sharing of information sharing and reciprocal participation.

b. U.S. Special Operations Command

(1) SOFCIDS is the process used by USSOCOM to fulfill its reference (j) authority to validate requirements relating to special operations activities. The goal of the SOFCIDS process is to provide complete, current, and coordinated documentation of special operations CRs, gaps, and special operations-peculiar solutions required for special operations forces (SOF) to conduct special operations at acceptable levels of operational risk.

(2) The Commander, USSOCOM has validation authority for all SOFCIDS documents. CDRUSSOCOM has delegated this validation authority in part to the USSOCOM Vice Commander, as the Special Operations Command Requirements Evaluation Board (SOCREB) Chair. Held monthly, the SOCREB is USSOCOM's requirements board that validates SOFCIDS

documents supported by programs in the USSOCOM Program Objective Memorandum (POM). Additional information on SOFCIDS can be found in reference (k).

c. U.S. Cyber Command

(1) CCIDS is the process used by USCYBERCOM to fulfill its reference (l) authority to validate cyberspace operations capability requirements for the DoW. The goal of the CCIDS process is to provide complete, current, and coordinated documentation of cyberspace requirements, gaps, and solutions needed for the conduct of cyberspace operations at acceptable levels of operational risk.

(2) The Commander, USCYBERCOM has approval authority for all CCIDS documents. CDRUSCYBERCOM has delegated this approval authority in part to the USCYBERCOM Deputy Commander, as the Cyber Requirements Evaluation Board (CREB) Chair. Held monthly, the CREB is USCYBERCOM's requirements validation board that approves CCIDS documents supported by programs across the Services, CCMDs, and agencies.

8. JCI: By Exception Review of Program Changes

a. Any time after the Initial review, the JROC has the authority to conduct a By Exception review of Service/component capabilities. Specifically, the JROC will initiate By Exception reviews to assess Service/component capability development decisions with potential negative impacts to the JFD, JOPs, or the ability to meet JFRs/JCRs established by the JROC. By Exception reviews may focus on one of the following topics:

(1) Acquisition Reviews. Changes to cost/schedule/performance of individual capabilities that have negative impacts to the JFD. Acquisition Reviews include, but are not limited to, Nunn-McCurdy breaches and other JROC Tripwires. See paragraph 9, "Breaches, Tripwires, and Comebacks."

(2) Intelligence Reviews. Breaches including, but not limited to, CIP breaches, Cyber Incident Damage Assessments (CIDAs), Classified Information Compromise Assessments (CICAs), or other joint cyber assessments. See paragraph 9, "Breaches, Tripwires, and Comebacks."

(3) Capacity Reviews. Changes to the projected end strength of a given capability that have negative impacts to the JFD.

(4) Readiness Reviews. Changes or issues related to materiel or operational readiness with negative impacts to the Joint Force.

b. Topics for By Exception review can be directed by the JROC Chair or recommended by any JROC member or advisor to the appropriate Functional Capabilities Board (FCB) Chair. Programs selected for By Exception Review will follow the JFRP staffing process.

c. After final level review of the validated Service/component requirements documents, the JROC or subordinate board will sign and publish a JROCM. The JROCM will:

(1) Endorse all, some, or none of the Service/component requirements document as a JFR.

(2) Identify any issues as it relates to JFDD.

(3) Identify critical JCRs to inform WAS trade-space decisions.

(4) Establish tripwires and comebacks.

(5) Make recommendations, provide guidance and direction, or direct additional analysis related to joint implications.

(6) Capture the final position of Services and components with dissenting opinions, as appropriate.

(7) Make recommendations that can be forwarded to appropriate boards for action, including Service/component requirements/acquisition boards, as well as the RRAB.

9. JCI: Breaches, Tripwires, and Comebacks

a. JROC breaches, tripwires, and comebacks have been established to ensure JROC awareness of critical aspects of Service-/component-validated requirements and capabilities integral to the Joint Force. The appropriate level of review is determined by the JSD.

b. Through the breaches, tripwires, and comebacks detailed below, the JROC will make recommendations to the Services/components as appropriate to mitigate the impacts to the Joint Force.

(1) Nunn-McCurdy Breaches. Nunn-McCurdy Unit Cost Breach reviews of Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) are required by reference (m) when certain baseline cost thresholds are exceeded.

(a) Nunn-McCurdy breaches as defined as:

1. "Significant" Nunn-McCurdy Unit Cost Breach. When an MDAP experiences cost growth of 15 percent from their current baseline or 30 percent from their original baseline.

2. "Critical" Nunn-McCurdy Unit Cost Breach. When an MDAP experiences cost growth of 25 percent from their current baseline or 50 percent from their original baseline. Programs in "critical" breach status are subject to detailed review for potential cancellation.

(b) Notification. Sponsors must notify Congress within 45 calendar days after the report (normally program deviation report) upon which the determination is based. Sponsors must also submit required additional unit cost breach information IAW guidance published by OUSW(A&S).

(c) Review Team. USW(A&S) organizes integrated process teams (IPTs) to assess national security impact, analyze alternatives, estimate lifecycle costs, and review management structure. More detail on Nunn-McCurdy Unit Cost Breach procedures is in reference (n).

(d) Upon notification by the program sponsor/service of a Nunn-McCurdy Unit Cost Breach, the lead (and supporting, if necessary) FCB, together with other stakeholders involved in the review, will initiate a review of their capability portfolios to assess the impact of the program in question upon CRs in their capability portfolio.

(e) JROC Participation. The JROC or its subordinate boards review the relevant CRs, associated capability gaps, and operational risks, and provide recommendations with respect to the necessity of the program to the Joint Force satisfying the NDS.

(f) The review should begin with examination of how the program closes or mitigates gaps from JOPs or JFRs, or CCMD gaps. The continuation of a program experiencing a "Significant" Nunn-McCurdy breach depends on whether its capability is determined to be essential for national security. The JROC will make a recommendation to the SecWar IAW reference (o). Depending on the outcome of the SecWar's report to Congress, the JROC must consider impacts to JFD for programs that affect JOPs, JFRs, or CCMDs.

(g) Waiver. The sponsor may submit a written request to the FCB for relief if they do not believe the breach review is necessary. The FCB will review the sponsor's justification and provide a recommendation to J-8 DDRCD.

(2) Critical Intelligence Parameter Breach. A CIP breach occurs when the threat capability exceeds the threshold set within threat-sensitive Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) or equivalent performance attributes, which could critically impact the effectiveness and survivability of the proposed system or program. The program sponsor, in coordination with its Service Intelligence Center or DIA, will forward a CIP Breach Memorandum on a CIP Breach Notification to the JRC for review and processing.

(a) Review Process. The lead FCB and other stakeholders will conduct an up-front assessment to identify impacts to all systems within their portfolios from the assessed change in threat capability.

(b) The review will include, but is not limited to, the following considerations:

1. Impacts to the JFD and Service force designs.

2. Impacts to the program under review as well as other impacted programs within and across the portfolios.

3. Whether changes to the Universal Joint Tasks (UJTs) associated with the program are required. Assess the impact of these UJTs changes on dependent critical enablers.

4. Whether an adjustment to validated performance attributes is appropriate to address the changes in the threat.

5. Alternatives to the program to satisfy the original requirements and operational risk.

(3) Cyber Incident Damage Assessments

(a) Cyber incidents are a specific type of JROC breach that requires specialized reporting. OSW Damage Assessment Management Office (DAMO) oversees the process to conduct CIDAs of DoW programs and critical technologies, as required, on unauthorized access and potential compromise of unclassified Defense Industrial Base information systems, networks, and cloud computing systems containing unclassified DoW information IAW reference (p).

(b) OSW DAMO submits the CIDA via secure communication to the Joint Staff Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment, J-8 (DJ-8), who notifies the J-8 DDRCD. The J-8 DDRCD assesses relevant equities within the CIDA and identifies/assigns a lead FCB and other FCBs as appropriate. The capability sponsor coordinates across FCBs and with Services/components to further assess the CIDA, make any additional notifications (e.g., requirements managers, program managers), and develop a mitigation plan. Additionally, the Service/component Intelligence Production Center supports the FCBs in their evaluation of the compromise's impact and provides intelligence above the SECRET level, to include compartmented reporting, to assist in defining associated operational risk.

(c) FCBs provide the mitigation plan and monitor and continue to report progress towards mitigation activities. Potential mitigation actions could include:

1. Changes to JCRs.

2. Updates to CIPs.

3. DOTmLPF-P changes.

4. Changes to Service TTPs.

5. Updates to technology protection measures.

(4) Classified Information Compromise Assessments

(a) Classified Information Compromises are a specific type of JROC breach that requires specialized reporting. The IC, DoW counterintelligence elements, the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency, and other responsible organizations identify the compromise, and the responsible OCA conducts a damage assessment IAW Enclosure 6 to reference (q). The CICA process addresses classified information that, if obtained by an adversary, could decrease the effectiveness and survivability of any stage of a U.S. system through the Requirements and Acquisition lifecycle. Also included is unclassified or controlled unclassified information that, if compiled by an adversary, could become classified.

(b) The OCA submits the Damage Assessment Report (DAR) via secure communication to DJ-8, who notifies J-8 DDRCD. J-8 DDRCD assesses relevant equities within the DAR and identifies/assigns a lead FCB, and other FCBs as appropriate. The capability sponsor will coordinate across

other FCBs and with Services/sponsors to further assess the DAR, make any additional notifications (e.g., requirements managers, program managers), and develop a mitigation plan.

(c) FCBs will provide the mitigation plan to the Joint Capabilities Board (JCB)/JROC and will monitor and continue to report progress towards mitigation activities. Potential mitigation actions could include:

1. Changes to JCRs.

2. Updates to CIPs.

3. DOTmLPF-P changes.

4. Changes to Service TTPs.

(5) JROC Tripwires. JROC tripwires should be established and documented when a program is evaluated for the first time during JCI, and updated as required during each subsequent By Exception review. Historically, tripwires were established to ensure maximum awareness of a program's status prior to a formal Nunn-McCurdy Breach. J-8 Capabilities and Acquisition Division or J-8 Program and Budget Analysis Division (PBAD) will notify Joint Staff J-8 Deputy Director for Resources and Acquisition (DDRA) on "first knowledge" of program costs, schedule, and/or quantity changes that exceed the trigger values in the program's approved JROCM. This "first knowledge" notification initiates a tripwire review for this category of tripwire by the cognizant FCB.

(a) J-8 DDRA will notify the sponsor and lead FCB to initiate a tripwire review. First knowledge of a trigger condition is usually—but not exclusively—determined by one of the following events:

1. POM or budget reviews.

2. Program restructures.

3. Defense Acquisition Executive Summary reviews.

4. Overarching IPTs.

5. Selected Acquisition Reports.

6. Program Deviation Reports or changes to Acquisition Program Baselines.

(b) Tripwires do not need to be exclusively based on cost, schedule, or quantity changes. Although, historically, tripwires for cost, schedule, or quantity were tied to percentage changes, the FCB is encouraged to ensure that the tripwires are established based on relevant metrics that are significant and provide decision space for senior leaders.

(c) Furthermore, FCBs are encouraged to set tripwires that are directly or indirectly linked to JFD or JCI considerations. For example, trade space decisions made by Program Acquisitions Executives or Service Acquisitions Executives that significantly alter capability and performance merit tripwires in order to ensure that the changes are acknowledged in JFD and accounted for or mitigated, if necessary.

(6) JROC Comebacks. The JROC may request that a sponsor provide the JROC or a subordinate body with additional information at a later date. The JROC will document these decisions via JROCM, specifying the appropriate board and timeline for the JROC Comeback. The JROC Secretariat will track these comebacks and ensure the appropriate board is briefed IAW the timeline specified in the JROCM. Sponsors may request an extension and/or exemption to a JROC Comeback to J-8 DDRCD, with decisions being documented via a memorandum for record (MFR) in KM/DS system.

10. CCMD Requirements: Capability Gap Assessment

a. Capability Gap Assessment (CGA) is an iterative annual process that provides the JROC with a framework for the collection, consolidation, assessment, and prioritization of risk-informed CCMD capability gaps (reference (a)) to support the CJCS in advising and developing recommendations (reference (r)). It provides the CJCS with a consolidation of all the CCDRs' IPLs, and an evaluation of the current FYDP's adequacy to satisfy the gaps therein, as well as future FYDP recommendations to satisfy the CJCS's annual reporting requirements to Congress (reference (h)).

b. The primary inputs to the CGA process are the CCMD IPLs. An IPL is a list of the CCDR's highest priority requirements, prioritized across Service and functional lines, defining shortfalls in key programs that, in the judgement of the CCDR, adversely affect the ability of the CCDR's forces to accomplish their assigned mission. In order to effectively resolve the CCDR's highest priorities, the IPL should consist of a prioritized list of singular, discrete capability gaps.

c. The annual CGA process is comprised of three sequential phases:

(1) Phase 1: Gap Management and IPL Submission. Commences upon signature of the previous year's CGA JROCM and concludes with JCD assignment of gaps to appropriate portfolios for FCB assessment.

(a) Combatant Commands. Review their full list of previously identified capability gaps and update relevant gap records, including approved Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs)/Joint Emergent Operational Needs (JEONs) in IPLs, rescinding gaps that are no longer relevant, closing gaps that have been resolved, and entering new gaps that have not previously been identified.

(b) J-8 Joint Capabilities Division. Conducts review of gaps included on the CCMD IPLs and finalizes gap binning across portfolios and FCBs.

(2) Phase 2: Gap Assessment and Recommendation Development. Phase 2 begins with the FCB reception of portfolio-aligned capability gaps included on the CCMD IPLs and concludes with the submission of finalized gap assessments and recommendations to JCD.

(a) Functional Capabilities Boards

1. Review their capability portfolios and identify/create, manage, update, or remove on-going efforts (OGE) and recommended actions (RA) records, as relevant.

2. Assess the adequacy of the portfolio-aligned OGEs' ability to mitigate or resolve individual capability gaps.

3. Estimate residual risk for each submitting organization in light of OGE assessments.

4. Develop definitive recommendations focused on mitigating capability gap risk across the Joint Force.

(b) J-8 Joint Capabilities Division. Initialize cross-CCMD and cross-FCB capability gap portfolio prioritization.

(3) Phase 3: Final Product Development and JROC Endorsement

(a) Phase 3 begins with JCD receipt of FCB assessments and recommendations and concludes with the signing of the CGA or JROCM.

(b) J-8 Joint Capabilities Division

1. Finalize cross-CCMD and cross-FCB capability gap portfolio prioritization.

2. Collate all capability gaps, OGEs, RAs, assessments, and recommendations for presentation and review by the JCB and endorsement by the JROC.

d. Roles and Responsibilities

(1) J-8 Joint Capabilities Division. The J-8 JCD serves as the CGA process facilitator and provides training, quality assurance, and stakeholder coordination throughout the process.

(2) Combatant Commands. The CCMDs are the primary stakeholders of the CGA process. They are responsible for the submission of their IPLs as well as maintaining, correcting, updating, and reprioritizing their past submissions.

(3) Functional Capabilities Boards. The FCBs are responsible for the integration and assessment of all CCMD IPL submissions within their capability portfolios, the assessment of previously identified efforts and recommendations, risk assessments, and the development of new recommendations for JCB/JROC review and approval.

(4) J-8 Special Access Program Control Office. The Special Access Program Control Office acts as the JRC for any gap information protected by Special Access Program (SAP)/Special Access Required (SAR) designations to enable FCB SAP/SAR informed recommendations to gaps.

(5) J-8 Program and Budget Analysis Division. PBAD provides budget-related assessments and assists JCD, CCMDs, and FCBs in requirement-to-resources mapping throughout the CGA process, including capability gaps, OGEs, and RAs.

11. CCMD Requirements: Joint Urgent Operational Needs/Joint Emergent Operational Needs

a. Process Overview

(1) The JUON and JEON processes are designed to address critical capability gaps that cannot be satisfied within the normal Planning, Programming,

Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process. If left unresolved, these gaps would result in mission failure of an ongoing or anticipated contingency operation or the loss of life requiring additional forces to accomplish assigned contingency operation mission objectives. JUONs and JEONs will be evaluated against six total criteria. In order to be approved, a JUON or JEON must meet one of the first two approval criteria below, and at least five of the six total. Those approval criteria are:

(a) Mission Failure. Prevents mission failure of an ongoing contingency operation (JUON) or anticipated contingency operation (JEON).

(b) Loss of Life. Prevents loss of life that would otherwise require additional forces to accomplish assigned contingency operation mission objectives.

(c) Nonexistent Capability within DoW. The capability does not currently exist in the Joint Force (i.e., has not been fielded), but a potential solution exists (including commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS), government-off-the-shelf (GOTS), non-developmental item (NDI), and/or science and technology (S&T)).

(d) Prioritization. The capability merits prioritization over all other non-urgent/emergent requirements.

(e) TTP Mitigation. The capability gap cannot be mitigated through changes in TTPs.

(f) Timely Fielding. The capability solution is at a sufficient TRL for fielding within the required timelines.

(2) The threshold for approving JUONs and JEONs is deliberately set very high, as approved JUONs or JEONs merit prioritization over all other non-urgent/emergent requirements. This reflects the critical nature of the gaps while recognizing the significant impact these programs have on the Services' deliberate acquisition programs, which may serve as offsets to fund urgent and emergent requirements. This process prioritizes speed and urgency over traditional acquisition pathways, ensuring rapid identification, evaluation, and approval of solutions.

(3) JUONs and JEONs are typically required due to an adversary's development and fielding of new capabilities or TTPs that cannot be countered or mitigated with existing Joint Force capabilities or by changing Joint Force TTPs. JUONs address gaps in ongoing contingency operations and must field

initial capability within 1 year and be fully fielded within 2 years. JEONs focus on anticipated contingency operations and must field initial capability within 2 years and be fully fielded within 3 years.

(4) To meet operational timelines for JUONs, compromises may be required in areas such as cost, interoperability, sustainability, survivability, and training. Partial and interim capability solutions may also be considered to ensure the operational timeline is met, even if the full capability cannot be immediately delivered. For JEONs, however, compromises in interoperability, sustainability, survivability, and training should not be accepted, given the longer fielding timeline in advance of an anticipated contingency operation.

b. Specific Steps in the JUON/JEON Process

(1) Step 1: Submission and Initial Triage

(a) Both JUONs and JEONs are submitted to the JUON/JEON Manager within J-8 JCD for initial triage. Initial triage is a 1-day process to determine the appropriate FCB and to determine if the submission meets either of the first two criteria:

1. Mission Failure. Prevents mission failure of an ongoing contingency operation (JUON) or anticipated contingency operation (JEON).

2. Loss of Life. Prevents loss of life that require additional forces to accomplish assigned contingency plan mission objectives.

(b) JUON/JEON Differences. JEONs may also be submitted by the CJCS or VCJCS, in addition to CCMDs.

Requirement	JUON	JEON
Definition	Critical requirements that cannot be satisfied with the normal PPBE process. If unresolved, would result in critical mission failure of an ongoing contingency operation or the loss of life requiring additional forces to accomplish assigned contingency operation mission objectives.	Critical requirements that cannot be satisfied with the normal PPBE process. If unresolved, would result in critical mission failure of an anticipated contingency operation or the loss of life requiring additional forces to accomplish anticipated contingency operation mission objectives.
Submission Authority	CCMDs	CCMDs, CJCS, or VCJCS
Approval Timeline	15 Business Days	45 Business Days
Approval Authority	J-8/DDRCD	JROC
Triage Criteria*	1. Mission failure of an ongoing contingency operation 2. Loss of life	1. Mission failure of an anticipated contingency operation 2. Loss of life
FCB Assessment Approval Criteria	3. Novel capability 4. Prioritization 5. TTP mitigation 6. Timely fielding	3. Novel capability 4. Prioritization 5. TTP mitigation 6. Timely fielding
Solution Sponsor Assignment	JRAC	JRAC
Fielding Timeline	• Initial capability within 1 year • Fully fielded capability within 2 years	• Initial capability within 2 years • Fully fielded capability within 3 years
Periodic Reviews	• Biannual JROC Review • Two-Year Review	• Biannual JROC Review • Two-Year Review
Extension Options	J-8/DDRCD may authorize a one-time extension of up to 2 years	JROC may authorize a one-time extension of up to 2 years

** JUON/JEON must meet one of the two triage criteria*

Table 2. Urgent and Emergent Requirements Comparison Table

(2) Step 2: FCB Assessment

(a) Accepted JUONs and JEONs are forwarded to the FCB for a detailed review, assessment, and recommendation to the approval authority. At a minimum, the FCB considers the following factors:

1. Changes in the Operational Environment. What has changed in the mission, enemy capabilities, or enemy TTPs that necessitates the described urgent or emergent capability.

2. Pathways. Can the capability gap be addressed through:

a. Changes in TTPs.

b. Global Force Management (GFM).

c. COTS, GOTS, or NDI solutions.

d. Early prototypes from ongoing acquisition programs or S&T efforts, including industry experimentation activities supported by MEIA.

e. Deliberate acquisition pathways.

3. Related Requirements. Identify any related JUONs, JEONs, or joint or Service-/component-specific requirements that may overlap with the capability gap.

4. Operational Timelines. Assess whether the proposed solution can realistically meet the required timeline.

5. Threat Review. Assess the consistency of the threat environment with the DIE analytic baseline and that proposed solutions remain viable during the proposed employment timeline, in coordination with DIA as required.

6. Alignment with Approval Criteria. Both JUONs and JEONs must meet five of six criteria for approval, with at least one of the first two criteria being mandatory for progression beyond initial triage.

(b) FCB Recommendations. The FCB has 14 business days to assess and make a recommendation to J-8 DDRCD. The FCB has 30 business days to assess and make a recommendation to the JROC. The FCB will make one of the following recommendations:

1. Approval. The JUON/JEON meets required criteria and should proceed to the next step.

2. Partial Approval. Certain aspects of the JUON/JEON meet the criteria, but the scope or requirements may need to be adjusted.

3. Alternate Pathway. The capability gap can be addressed through other means, such as changes in TTPs, GFM, or deliberate acquisition pathways.

4. Rejection. The JUON/JEON does not meet the required criteria and should not proceed further. If the approval authority determines that JUON or JEON criteria are not met, the approval authority will return the JUON or JEON to the requirement sponsor with an explanation for the denial and a

recommendation that the requirement sponsor accept risk, adopt a non-materiel approach, or pursue the requirement through the deliberate requirements validation process or other processes (e.g., GFM). JUONs/JEONs that are rejected due to technological readiness concerns will be forwarded to OUSW(A&S) Acquisition Integration and Interoperability (AI2) and OUSW(R&E) for awareness and potential capability development.

(3) Step 3: Approval Decision

(a) JUON/JEON Commonality. The approval authority makes one of four decisions: Approval, Partial Approval, Alternate Pathway, or Rejection.

(b) JUON/JEON Differences

1. JUONs. An approval decision is made and documented by J-8 DDRCD within 15 days of JUON submission. The JROC Chair has delegated this authority to J-8 DDRCD based on the urgency and expedited timelines. J-8 DDRCD will notify the JROC Chair of all assessment outcomes. Either the proposed solution sponsor or the requirement sponsor may appeal a JUON approval decision to the JROC Chair by submitting an MFR to the JUON/JEON manager following an approval decision by J-8 DDRCD.

2. JEONs. An approval decision is made and documented by the JROC within 45 days of submission to the JUON/JEON manager.



Figure 1. JUON Staffing Process



Figure 2. JEON Staffing Process

(4) Step 4: Assignment of Solution Sponsor. Approved JUONs and JEONs are forwarded to the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) to identify and assign a solution sponsor responsible for funding, developing, and fielding the capability.

(5) Step 5: Fielding

(a) Requirements sponsors and solutions sponsors will work closely with OUSW(R&E), OUSW(A&S) AI2, and industry to accelerate the development and fielding of required capabilities within the following timelines:

1. JUONs. The initial capability must be fielded within 1 year of assigning a solution sponsor, while the capability must be fully fielded within 2 years.

2. JEONs. The initial capability must be fielded within 2 years of assigning a solution sponsor, while the capability must be fully fielded within 3 years.

(b) Upon initial fielding, the requirement sponsor has 6 months to provide an Assessment of Operational Utility (AOU) to the solution sponsor, JRAC, and the JRC.

(c) The evolution of Joint Force and adversary capabilities may necessitate modifications to existing JUONs and JEONs.

(d) Minor or Administrative Modifications. These can be made in coordination with the approval authority and the solution sponsor.

(e) Significant Modifications. Any modification requiring substantial changes to the capabilities being developed must go through the formal approval process. This typically involves canceling the original JUON/JEON and approving the modified requirements as a new JUON/JEON with its own timeline.

(6) Step 6: Reviews and Oversight

(a) Semi-Annual Reviews. Twice per year, the JROC will review all JUONs and JEONs to assess if the urgent or emergent requirement remains valid and assess the progress toward fielding capabilities in a timely manner. These reviews will identify how the capability will be manned, trained, equipped, and sustained during the contingency operation. Additionally, these reviews serve to preemptively identify issues and challenges that may prevent fulfillment of a requirement within the operational timeframe, identify fiscal considerations, and discuss the status and results of AOUs (if available) and disposition decisions to determine their impact on the execution plan.

(b) Two-Year Review

1. JUON/JEON Commonality

a. Purpose of the Review. Both JUONs and JEONs undergo a 2-year review to assess if the urgent or emergent requirement remains valid and to provide the approval authority with an update on the status of fielding, the timeline for the AOU, and disposition recommendations.

b. Plan of Action and Milestones. For both JUONs and JEONs that fail to meet the required 2-year fielding timeline, the review requires a Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) for completing the fielding of the capability, the AOU, and the disposition decision.

c. Approval Authority's Options. In both cases, the approval authority can either cancel the requirement or authorize a one-time extension of up to 2 years based on the likelihood of successfully fielding the capability.

d. Extension Requirements. If an extension is granted, all requirements to close the JUON or JEON—such as the AOU, Disposition Analysis, and Disposition Recommendation—must be completed during the extension period.

2. JUON/JEON Differences

a. Fielding Expectations. For JUONs, the capability is expected to be fully fielded by the 2-year mark. For JEONs, only the initial capability is required to be fielded by the 2-year mark, with capability fully fielding within 3 years.

b. Focus of the Review. The JUON review emphasizes whether the full capability has been fielded and, if not, outlines the steps to complete fielding. The JEON review focuses on whether the initial capability has been fielded and, if not, provides a plan to ensure fielding within the extended timeline.

c. JUONs that have previously been designated as "Sustain for Contingency Operation" will undergo a review every 2 years. That review should cover all aspects of an initial approval review and provide similar recommendations to the Approval Authority.

(7) Step 7: Assessment of Operational Utility. One of the first steps towards closing a fielded JUON or JEON is the development of the AOU by the CCMD and the solution sponsor. Within 6 months of fielding a JUON or JEON, the requirement sponsor will submit an AOU to the solution sponsor and the approval authority. The AOU will inform the approval authority about the utility of the fielded capability. The format for the AOU is located in the documents portion of this manual. The AOU will assist with the Disposition Analysis and the final determination to close the JUON/JEON. Key recommendations and comments in the AOU include:

(a) Transition to a Program of Record. Recommended for significant capabilities with broader utility should be recommended for transition to a program of record.

(b) Sustain for Current Contingency. Recommended for niche capabilities with limited utility outside the current contingency (JUON only).

(c) Cancellation. Recommended for capabilities that are insufficient for the requirement and should be considered for transfer to a dedicated acquisitions pathway for further development.

(8) Step 8: Disposition Analysis and Recommendation. Upon fully fielding the capability, and taking the AOU into consideration, the solution sponsor will conduct a disposition analysis and recommendation IAW section 4.5 of reference (s). That recommendation should take into consideration

performance of the fielded capability, mishap data, long-term operational needs, and how the capability fits into the solutions sponsor's Force Development and Force Design.

(9) Step 9: Final Decision. The approval authority will take into consideration the AOU and Disposition Recommendation prior to making the final decision to close the JUON/JEON, which will be documented by a JROCM. JUONs and JEONs can be closed through one of three methods: transition to a program of record, sustainment for the current contingency (JUONs only), or cancellation. Each method reflects the operational relevance, performance, and long-term viability of the capability.

(a) Transition to a Program of Record. Capabilities that serve an enduring purpose are to be transitioned to a program of record. This ensures long-term sustainment and integration into the Joint Force.

(b) Sustainment for Current Contingency (JUONs Only). JUONs may be sustained for the duration of the current contingency operation if the capability is niche or an immature capability that is not intended or ready for transition to a program of record. These programs will undergo a review every 2 years for approval to be maintained as a JUON.

(c) Cancellation. JUON/JEONS that are cancelled due to an inability to field a viable solution will be forwarded to OUSW(A&S) AI2 and OUSW(R&E) for further development and consideration for inclusion in MEIA experimentation. Additionally, these requirements may be forwarded to the Services for deliberate capability development efforts. A JUON or JEON may be cancelled for several reasons, including:

1. The end of the contingency operation for which it was intended.

2. Failure to meet required timelines.

3. Failure of solutions to meet requirements.

4. Discovery of non-materiel solutions that negate the need for a materiel solution.

5. Threat or anticipated contingency operation is not realized.

6. New program of record or other material solution addressing closing gap via other means

12. CCMD Derived Requirement

a. A CCMD Derived Requirement (CDR) provides the CCMD the avenue to specify one or more JCRs (i.e., tasks, conditions, standards) and associated capability gaps. CDRs allow CCMDs an avenue to define requirements that are appropriate for the deliberate lane (i.e., do not meet the urgent/emergent timelines or criteria), with more specificity than an IPL. The CDR also allows for recommendations partially or wholly mitigating identified capability gaps(s) with a materiel capability solution, or some combination of materiel and non-materiel solutions. The approval authority for CDRs is the originating CCDR. CCMD-approved CDRs will be submitted into KM/DS and go through the JFRP staffing process to inform JFDD activities.

b. The intent of the CDR is to expedite capability development by providing the Services with a document that captures all of the essential material to bypass writing an Initial Capability Document (or equivalent) and to link their Capability Development Document (or equivalent) to the CDR.

c. See Joint Requirements Documents for document format information.

13. Capability Portfolio Management

a. CPM is currently governed by references (t) and (u). CPM is used to inform capability improvements through the lens of joint, integrated mission effects. The objective of CPM is to align investments, requirements, interoperability, designs, and acquisitions of related capabilities across the DoW.

b. CPM requires the DoW to view its investments and divestments from a departmental level by integrating the outcomes from respective portfolio management processes (e.g., Capability Portfolio Management Reviews (CPMRs), Integrated Acquisition Portfolio Reviews (IAPRs), Technology Modernization Transition Reviews (TMTRs), and PBRs).

c. The goal of CPM is to fully inform portfolio decisions through the balancing of warfighting requirements, acquisition health, technological and human readiness, mission impacts, and funding considerations. This collaborative approach to analyze risks, issues, and opportunities enables DoW to innovate, develop, and field modernized capabilities with timelines and affordability as a priority.

d. USW(A&S), USW(R&E), and the JROC Chair will make joint decisions on common CPM assessment areas, including problem statement, scope, and timeline, each FY. These CPM assessment areas will align to the highest

priority JOPs—prioritized by the JROC and selected by the RRAB—in addition to other topic areas agreed to by USW(A&S), USW(R&E), and the JROC Chair. CPM assessments aligned to the highest priority JOPs will also be aligned to the PBR timeline. For each CPM assessment area, CPMR, IAPR, and TMTR findings will address the risk trade-space across requirements, integration challenges, technical feasibility, technology maturity, and scheduling constraints. The CPM review process will integrate findings and provide recommendations to either accept operational risk, modify existing solutions that close gaps or mitigate risk associated with meeting applicable requirements in strategic guidance and/or addressing JOPs, or establish requirements for new programs. Figure 3 depicts the joint level processes of CPMR, IAPR, TMTR, and JFD in relation to the CPM process flow.



* DOTMLPF - Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy
** LRPISMTFC - Laws, Regulations, Policies, Infrastructure, Supply Chain, Management, Technologies, Funding, Contracting.

Figure 3. CPM Flow and Related Processes

e. OUSW(A&S) is currently revising reference (t) and developing a departmental instruction to codify changes and provide further guidance on CPM execution.

f. Mission engineering is a key element of CPM and implementation guidance will be IAW reference (v).

14. Capability Portfolio Management Review

a. CPMR is the JROC's analytic approach to support DoW investment decision-making from a joint warfighter requirements perspective. CPMRs

provide the analytical underpinning for the JROC to identify capability gaps and determine their prioritization across JFDD.

b. CPMR is one of the joint-level portfolio reviews under CPM as described in Figure 3, and follows the same five step portfolio review process. CPMR can be conducted independently for steps 1 and 2; steps 3 through 5 must be conducted holistically to incorporate the results from the other reviews to provide holistic portfolio recommendations.

c. FCBs will conduct CPMRs to:

(1) Identify and prioritize JFRs as derived from strategic documents, warfighting concepts, CCMD inputs, and ongoing JFDD activities.

(2) Identify capability gaps and prioritize their associated risks (i.e., gap analysis).

(3) Identify unwarranted duplication for potential divestment.

(4) Identify potential solutions and opportunities to address capability gaps.

(5) Identify risks associated with the potential solutions, to include DOTmLPF-P solutions.

(6) Identify warfighting dependency risks, to include A&P dependencies.

(7) Assess overall risk and make risk trades.

(8) Provide prioritized recommendations to address the capability gap risks to inform investments prioritization.

(9) Provide the warfighter's perspective to support investment selections.

d. Other review processes, such as IAPRs and TMTRs, can be integrated to provide a more holistic analysis. In such cases, the reviews should be pre-coordinated to divide the analytic responsibilities to the appropriate organizations to focus on their respective strengths. For example, OUSW(A&S) conducting IAPRs should focus on step 3 to provide options.

15. Capability Portfolio Management Review Process

a. Inventory. Define the problem or mission, and associated operational objectives. This includes the threat, associated scenario(s), and time horizons. Problem or mission drivers include JFD problems, joint concepts, CCMD IPL, and urgent/emergent needs.

(1) Conduct an inventory of all CRs. CRs can be derived from the problem or mission noted above. These CRs can be synthesized using the UJTs taxonomy (including Service Task Lists) and the task, conditions, and standards format. Additionally, transforming the problem in mission threads and mission architectures provides structure for objective and computer-aided analysis of the relationship between CRs and insights into the method of employments as well as graphical depictions aid understanding and communication between all stakeholders.

(2) Conduct an inventory of all current solutions—including COTS, GOTS, and NDI—potentially able to address the CRs. This inventory process can be accelerated if solutions and programs were tagged using the UJTL construct.

(3) Integrate threat assessments of most likely and most dangerous adversary capabilities and TTPs, consistent with the defined problem or mission.

b. Change or Gap Analysis

(1) Conduct gap analysis by comparing the solutions inventory against the CRs. The gap may be the result of no existing capability, lack of proficiency or sufficiency in an existing capability solution, or the need to replace an existing capability solution to prevent a future gap. Gap analysis should include CCMD inputs to characterize and quantify the gaps and associated operational risk. Three outcomes from the gap analysis:

(a) A CR is addressed by an acquisition program or implementation of DOTmLPF-P changes.

(b) A CR not yet addressed by an acquisition program or implementation of DOTmLPF-P changes.

(c) A conceptual mismatch exists.

(2) One gap analysis method is to layer the solutions inventory over the mission threads and transform them into mission engineering threads. This provides insights into the functional relationship between systems to support technical integration and interoperability assessment.

(3) Other analytic methods include surveys, comparative analysis, wargaming, experimentation, and modeling and simulation (M&S).

c. Formulate Options

(1) For CRs with no associated gaps, characterize the solutions' effectiveness, sufficiency, suitability, and dependencies for subsequent analysis of the feasibility and affordability of solving the problem or mission in totality.

(2) For CRs with associated gaps, identify solutions—to include DOTmLPF-P—and their associated acquisition/technology risks. The MEIA can be an integral part of this step.

(3) Assess the proposed solutions for effectiveness, sufficiency, suitability, dependencies in addressing the identified gaps, and ability to complete the mission. Proposed solutions assessment can be conducted via literature review, expert opinions (including CCMDs), comparative analysis, wargaming, experimentation, and M&S.

d. Assess Risk Trades

(1) Conduct trade-off analysis between operational risks, acquisition feasibility and constraints, and affordability considerations. Effectiveness, sufficiency, and suitability need to be balanced against feasibility and affordability. An integrated review with OUSW(A&S) and OUSW(R&E) through IAPR and TMTR provides a more comprehensive assessment of feasibility and affordability by leveraging their expertise.

(2) CPMR will recommend to either:

(a) Accept the operational risk to mission or risk to force (i.e., leave the gap unfilled).

(b) Modify existing solutions to close the gap/mitigate the risk.

(c) Establish requirements for new programs.

e. Recommend Prioritization

(1) Prioritization within and across portfolios is the goal of CPM. CPMR will offer prioritization based operational risk as measured through effectiveness, sufficiency, suitability, operational dependencies risk to mission and risk to force. This prioritization should address strategic goals.

(2) Integrate operational prioritization with acquisition feasibility and affordability consideration priorities. Reference (t) provides various methods to conduct prioritization.

f. Once portfolio reviews are complete, prioritization and other action recommendations must be communicated to the appropriate decision body with authorities, such as the JROC, RRAB, or Deputy's Management Action Group (DMAG), to direct changes in requirements, acquisition, or resourcing. The portfolio review lead will coordinate with the secretariats of these decision bodies for staffing, documentation, and briefing pathway to gain a decision. In addition to portfolio review identified priorities, the following are some examples of other outcomes:

(1) JROC approving a JFR. This may be in the form of a Capstone Requirements Document (CRD).

(2) Propose developing new concepts based on portfolio reviewed identified capabilities or technologies, including COTS, GOTS, and NDI.

(3) Propose force design changes to enhance effectiveness and efficiency based on the portfolio review of all solutions and options.

(4) CPMR support to acquisition program decision points to determine whether a program should continue, be modified, be paused, or be cancelled. This aligns with FCB support for addressing tripwires and breaches.

g. Once portfolio decisions are made by the appropriate authorities (JROC, RRAB, DMAG), the portfolio lead will capture and update appropriate portfolio roadmaps.

(1) Update mission threads as required.

(2) Update the data system supporting requirements and CPM.

h. Additional information can be found in the CPMR Guide on KM/DS.

16. Integrated Acquisition Portfolio Review

a. The IAPR is a USW(A&S)-led process that identifies and assesses acquisition portfolio risks and opportunities within the lens of satisfying JCRs. An IAPR provides prioritized solutions to address capability in ensuring joint interoperability and integration, addressing JOPs, meeting applicable requirements in the NDS, filling capability gaps, and strengthening synchronization of warfighting concepts, technologies, requirements, program execution, and end-to-end mission performance to meet strategic objectives.

b. As part of CPM, IAPRs are conducted with CPMRs and TMTRs to address JOPs prioritized by the JROC. CPM is guided by the NDS and addresses operational problems by examining CRs, joint mission threads, and threat analysis information. Through this lens, IAPRs examine portfolios of programs to assess program health to fulfill CRs and meet joint force needs. IAPRs make recommendations to fill capability gaps, invest/divest from programs, identify interdependencies, and align program decision-making with joint force requirements.

c. IAPRs will:

(1) Identify and address interdependencies and critical risks within and across portfolio to strengthen synchronization of warfighting concepts, technologies, requirements, and program execution to inform enterprise decisions and enable end-to-end mission capability.

(2) Identify portfolio interdependencies viewed from a mission engineering perspective, focusing on critical DoW mission engineering threads to ensure alignment between systems, infrastructure, and resources across the DoW.

(3) Create portfolio roadmaps to identify when new capabilities are scheduled for fielding and legacy systems are scheduled for retirement.

(4) Ensure alignment from joint warfighting, technical interfaces, testing, infrastructure, mission thread, and sustainment perspectives.

(5) Include cost, schedule, and performance assessments that may be used to shape future investment decisions to maximize mission impact.

(6) Identify issues and opportunities and make recommendations for strategic decisions and actions to address/pursue.

(7) Report key findings and issues to senior leaders.

17. Technology Modernization Transition Review

a. The TMTR is a USW(R&E)-led process that evaluates the alignment of S&T portfolio risks and opportunities within the lens of CRs. The TMTR product informs DoW leadership to ensure congruency between strategic objectives and required outcomes, technology development initiatives, resource/ budgetary allocation, and S&T implementation decisions. The TMTR informs annual budgetary decision-making and adjustments to S&T development plans.

b. Purpose of a TMTR

(1) The primary goal of a TMTR is to ensure congruence between:

(a) Prioritization of S&T initiatives.

(b) Contribution to strategic objectives, including the ability to transition to enduring capabilities that meet operational mission needs.

(c) Resource allocation.

(2) At a more advanced level, the goal is to optimize the trade-offs between S&T initiatives and their resourcing to maximize attainment of the strategic vision.

(3) The TMTR process serves as an annual check of the entire S&T innovation pipeline, allowing stakeholders to assess the value of proposed and ongoing technology maturation projects. This assessment helps establish priorities for meeting near-, mid-, and far-term goals. The annual review comprehensively assesses which projects should be accelerated, which should be divested from to reallocate resources, how to address shared risks across the portfolio, areas for improved outcomes through synergy, and removal of unwarranted duplication.

c. Implementation of TMTRs

(1) TMTRs are implemented by examining sub-portfolios within the DoW's S&T initiatives. These sub-portfolios can be organized by:

(a) Technology type (e.g., artificial intelligence).

(b) Joint function (e.g., protection, fires).

(c) Organizational lines (e.g., Services).

(2) Although implemented through sub-portfolio reviews, the TMTR process is structured to enable aggregation into a comprehensive view and prioritization across the entirety of the S&T/research and development community. Similarly, TMTRs are structured to provide the "technologists' viewpoint," one of several viewpoints integrated into the DoW's overall CPM process.

d. CPM is the process of aligning strategic priorities with the methods and resources needed to achieve that strategy. TMTRs are a part of this decisional trade-space and are part of the larger set of CPM reviews that harmonize across other DoW initiatives, such as requirements, acquisition programs, affordability, energy, and intelligence. The separate review processes allow each organization to specialize in its viewpoint and the assessment of its initiatives, risks, and benefits.

e. A consistent structure and methodology underpin these reviews, enabling integration of results from:

(1) USW(R&E)-conducted TMTRs.

(2) Joint Staff-conducted CPMRs.

(3) USW(A&S)-conducted IAPRs.

(4) OSW CAPE-conducted PBRs.

f. TMTR Product

(1) The TMTR will produce a TMTR out-brief that addresses three broad categories:

(a) A rank ordering of initiatives to achieve the strategy, based on a benefit-to-risk assessment. This recommendation—based on R&E equities and risk—prioritizes initiatives for funding until available resources (e.g., funding, resources, manpower) are exhausted.

(b) Recommended application of R&E special programs, earmarks, set asides, etc. to accelerate maturation, lower risk, or multiply the effectiveness of the investment, increasing the initiative's success and transition potential.

(c) An integrated roadmap to mature, integrate, and transition the technology initiatives into a realized capability. This roadmap embodies the

other TMTR products, achieves the strategic goals, and captures the technical and programmatic interdependencies, timelines, and synergy.

18. Capstone Requirements

a. Capstone Requirements provide top-down unified and overarching guidance to the Joint Force to align and enable continuous modernization and integration of bottom-up developed capabilities. Capstone Requirements identify the Joint Force needs, but do not prescribe how to execute the supporting capability development. Capstone Requirements provide capability developers a unified, joint perspective to focus resources and efforts. Capstone Requirements capture JCRs and prioritize them within a portfolio for iterative analysis under the DoW's CPM process.

b. Identification and Sponsorship. Capstone Requirements may be submitted by any Service or component. However, requirements sponsors that wish to develop a CRD must first provide justification to the JCB via general officer/flag officer/senior executive service (GO/FO/SES) memo. The memo should identify alignment to joint concept or joint operational problem, key stakeholders, JCAs, a tentative timeline for CRD development, and expected outcomes. The JCB reviews and accepts the memo and the assigned FCB provides coordination support to the sponsor.

c. Development and Approval. Upon acceptance by the JCB and assignment of an FCB coordinator, the CRD sponsor co-develops the Capstone Document with all key stakeholders and SMEs across the Services and components. The stakeholder community includes concept writers, capability developers, acquisition SMEs, and requirements SMEs. The FCB coordinator assists the sponsor with facilitating document development activities and expediting staffing and commenting actions. Capstone Requirements will be approved through the JROC and distributed for use.

d. Implementation. Capstone Requirements provide a shared understanding of warfighter needs through a "mission command" approach to requirements—defining high-level, enduring Capabilities Required, as well as supporting capabilities that encompass "needed effects" and "enabling capabilities." Approved Capstone Requirements are foundational to cross-portfolio analysis—including, but not limited to, JFD, JCI, and CPM—and transparency to close high-risk gaps and inform leader resource decisions. The FCB will continuously review the CRD's portfolio of JCRs for changes, including changes driven by the threats, capability development, and programs and technologies status changes.

e. WAS stakeholders can leverage Capstone Requirements to accelerate Service/component requirements processes and pursue all available acquisition pathways and efforts to support the needs of warfighters. This approach supports agile capability development sprints and iterative fielding, providing real-time visibility of where to prioritize resourcing and technology investments for both urgent/emerging needs and long-term modernization.

f. Capstone Requirement JCRs guide experimentation and exercises objectives to provide for better informed assessments of capability solution performance, gap closure, and residual risk. Capstone Requirements can also support resource decision making in the PPBE process by providing for robust traceability between the missions, requirements, and capability solutions supported by DoW resources.

g. See Joint Requirements Documents for document format information.

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ENCLOSURE B

JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL AND JOINT FORCE REQUIREMENTS PROCESS ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES AND GUIDANCE

1. Governance

a. The JROC and its subordinate support structure are intended to streamline processes and enable rapid capability development while balancing near-term necessities with long-term strategic objectives. By delegating significant aspects of requirements management and capability development to the Services/components, the JFRP aims to accelerate capability development to the warfighter—but also increases risk in terms of joint integration and interoperability. As such, the JROC emphasizes the importance of early collaboration across Services/components to avoid unnecessary redundancies and ensure joint interoperability, joint integration, and alignment with the NDS.

b. In executing the JFRP, the JROC intends to comply with the following guiding principles:

(1) Productively Adversarial versus Consensus-Based. Historically, the JROC operated as a consensus-based organization, which rewarded and encouraged decisions that appease all parties sufficiently without satisfying anyone completely. Going forward, the JROC will not require consensus; rather, it will encourage productive disagreement and debate. Final decisions will be made by the Chair in coordination with the members and considering inputs from the advisors. Divergent viewpoints will be highlighted, with JROC stakeholders attempting to resolve issues at the appropriate level, up to and including at the JROC itself. While reference (a) maintains that "the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [VCJCS] shall provide the Chairman any dissenting view of members of the Council," this requirement will not be construed to stifle disagreement nor require complete consensus prior to JROC decisions. Rather, at the discretion of the Chair, a JROCM may contain dissenting opinions of any principal member. If a principal member of the JROC has a dissenting opinion that was not adequately conveyed in the JROC, the principal member may provide their own dissenting opinion to the CJCS.

(2) Delegated Decision Authority. Historically, the JROC retained most of its validation authorities at the 3–4 star level, with Service-/component-specific capabilities delegated to their respective requirements processes. The FCBs primarily served as a forum to prepare decisions for the superior boards, and could not make even non-controversial decisions on their own. Going forward, the JROC will delegate decisions to the lowest possible level while maintaining

appropriate awareness. This delegation will primarily be accomplished through the use of JSDs and by empowering the FCBs as decision making bodies. The JROC will trust and empower the JCB and FCBs to make decisions with its full authority, maintaining awareness and managing by negation when needed.

(3) Simplified Processes and Documents. Historically, the JCIDS Manual exceeded 400 pages, and individual requirements documents were often longer than 50 pages. With the growth of this process and documentation, the original intent of the system and purpose of the process was obfuscated over time. Successive updates to the manual were additive, increasing complexity without removing or simplifying extraneous processes. Going forward, the JROC will seek to ensure that the joint requirements manual does not substantially grow in length or complexity and that requirements documentation remain clear and concise, maintaining only information that is necessary.

(4) Measure What Matters. Historically, JCIDS contained process metrics that neither captured the effectiveness of the joint requirements process nor were actively tracked or reported. Going forward, the JFRP will define clear measures of performance (MOP) and measures of effectiveness (MOE) and track/report these metrics to the JROC on a regular basis. The JROC will be a data-driven organization, constantly evaluating the effectiveness of efficiency of its operations to ensure alignment to its first principles and intended governance.

2. Staffing

a. Document Submission

(1) The JRC manages the overall flow of requirements documents, ensures stakeholder visibility into documents approved by independent validation authorities, and provides support to joint requirement activities.

(2) Requirements sponsors provide requirements documents to the JRC via their Service/component Gatekeeper to facilitate single point of entry into the JFRP and for submission and determination of the appropriate staffing process.

(3) For requirements documents and related data classified at or below the SECRET level, and not protected by Alternative Compensatory Control Measures (ACCM) or SAP/SAR, sponsors submit documents and related data via the KM/DS system.

(4) For documents and related data classified above the SECRET level and not protected by ACCM or SAP/SAR, sponsors enter placeholder records in the KM/DS system and then provide the documents to the JRC via the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS). The placeholder record will include instructions on document location and how to access.

(5) For documents and related data protected by SAP/SAR, sponsors or the J-8/SAPCOORD enter a placeholder record in KM/DS only when the presence of the requirements protected by SAP/SAR designation can be disclosed at or below the classification level of SECRET.

(6) For documents protected by ACCM, sponsors enter a placeholder record in the KM/DS system only when the presence of the requirements protected by ACCM designation can be disclosed at or below the SECRET classification level. Sponsors coordinate with the JRC to ensure appropriate personnel are accessed to the ACCM for the review, and that documents are handled IAW the ACCM protections.

b. Joint Staffing Designators

(1) The staffing process and final review authority of a requirement is determined by its JSD. The four JSDs, from highest to lowest are: JROC Interest, JCB Interest, FCB Interest, and Service Information. To maximize speed and flexibility in the staffing process, JSDs will be set at the lowest possible level and may be changed during staffing at the discretion of each Chair beginning with the FCB. A change in JSD will be communicated to the JRC and documented via an MFR.

(2) JSDs will be assigned based on the following criteria:

(a) If the proposed program is expected to have a significant impact on JFD.

(b) If the validated Service/component requirement relies on materiel or non-materiel capability solutions external to the validating organization.

(c) If the proposed program is a unique capability for the DoW, including instances where only one Service provides the capability but multiple other Services depend on it or when the JROC is concerned about insufficient resiliency or redundancy.

(d) If the proposed program is expected to have a significant resource impact on the DoW, including proposed Acquisition Category (ACAT) level.

(e) Previous JSD designation IAW reference (c). Any Service/ component or FCB may request a JSD reclassification by submitting an MFR to the JRC and the lead FCB.

(3) JROC Interest. JROC Interest should be reserved for the largest, most complex, highest risk, or most critical requirements, where the intended level of joint oversight cannot be satisfied by assignment of a lower-level JSD. The JROC is the final review authority for JROC Interest documents. The JROC may elevate the JSD of lower-level documents at any time by directing the JRC to set the JSD to JROC Interest. JROC Interest applies to requirements that are necessary to fulfill a capability gap of more than one armed force or have capabilities with joint dependencies and meet one of the following criteria:

(a) Proposed capability projected to be ACAT I or equivalent level.

(b) Proposed capability must be interoperable with or require changes to ACAT I or equivalent level programs external to the validating organization.

(4) JCB Interest. JCB Interest should be used for requirements where the intended level of oversight does not meet the JROC threshold, but cannot be satisfied by assignment of a lower-level JSD. JCB Interest is the minimum JSD for joint DOTmLPF-P Change Requests (JDCRs) and for any documents where the sponsor is a CCMD, with the exception of USSOCOM or USCYBERCOM. Applies to requirements that are necessary to fulfill a capability gap of more than one armed force or have capabilities with joint dependencies and meet one of the following criteria:

(a) Proposed capability projected to be ACAT II or equivalent level.

(b) Proposed capability must be interoperable with or require changes to ACAT II or equivalent level programs external to the validating organization,

(5) FCB Interest. FCB Interest is used for requirements where the intended level of oversight does not meet the JCB threshold but still requires a minimal level of joint review. The lead FCB is the final review authority for FCB Interest documents. Applies to requirements that are necessary to fulfill a

capability gap of more than one armed force or have capabilities with joint dependencies and meet one of the following criteria:

(a) Proposed capability projected to be ACAT III or equivalent level.

(b) Proposed capability must be interoperable with or require changes to ACAT III or equivalent level programs external to the validating organization.

(6) Service Information. Service Information applies to requirements documents that are inherently Service-specific, with minimal joint impacts, and is applied to all Service-/component-approved documents that do not meet the criteria for JROC, JCB, or FCB Interest. The sponsor organization has independent approval/validation authority for Service Information requirements and capabilities documents not identified by the JSDs above.

c. Staffing Process

(1) The JFRP staffing process proceeds as follows:

(a) JRC Coordination and Review (5 Business Days)

1. IAW reference (i), all approved Service/component requirements documents will be submitted by the requirements sponsor to the JRC via KM/DS in a machine-readable format for JCI.

2. Requirements sponsors will recommend one of four JSDs: JROC Interest, JCB Interest, FCB Interest, or Service Information.

3. Requirements sponsors recommending a JSD of FCB Interest or higher will also recommend a lead FCB that best matches the functional area of the proposed capability.

4. The JRC, or appropriately cleared reviewer, will review the document and recommendations made by the sponsor and make a recommendation to J-8/DDRCD whether the program:

a. Has joint equities and should enter the joint requirements process

b. Should be returned to the Service/component without further action required.

5. J-8/DDRCD will review the JSD and FCB recommendations and make an initial determination. The JRC will notify all relevant stakeholders, including the requirements sponsor, relevant FCBs, and JROC Secretariat.

6. Programs with a JSD of Service Information will be archived in KM/DS and no additional action will be taken as part of an initial review.

7. Programs with a JSD of FCB Interest or higher will be sent to the relevant FCB and enter the JFRP staffing process and proceed via the following steps.

(b) FCB Coordination and Review (Up to 30 Business Days)

1. FCBs will review the document as it relates to:

a. Impacts on JFDD.

b. Attributes that are critical to the Joint Force, including addressing JOPs consistent with the projected threat baseline.

c. Whether elements of the proposed capability solution will satisfy JFRs/JCRs.

d. Traceability to prioritized joint gaps.

e. Joint integration, interoperability, and other dependencies.

f. Whether it provides redundancy or creates resiliency.

g. Whether it drives impacts to other elements of the Joint Force.

2. In parallel, JROC stakeholders will be provided up to 10 business days for document review and commenting. Stakeholders will highlight issues, concerns, and barriers to requirements sponsors and FCBs. Stakeholders will provide comments related to the criteria above as well as the impacts on their organization, including:

a. Positive impact (e.g., solves gap, provides resiliency).

b. Negative impact (e.g., drives requirements, creates redundancy).

c. Neutral impact.

3. Sponsors and FCB are provided up to 10 business days for comment review. While comments are information only and do not need to be adjudicated, sponsors and FCBs are highly encouraged to review comments, engage with stakeholders to understand and incorporate feedback to the greatest extent possible.

4. An FCB will be held to review Service/component requirements documents. FCB Working Group (WG) can be held beforehand at the discretion of the FCB Lead, but is not required.

5. The FCB will provide an overview of relevant information for 1–2 star GO/FO/SES leadership of JROC members and advisors, including highlighting critical comments from stakeholders for discussion.

6. For items with a JSD of FCB Interest, the FCB Chair will complete the review process and sign the JROCM. The JROCM will:

a. For Service/component requirements, endorse or reject the capability as addressing a JFR/JCR. For joint requirements, approve or reject the JFR/JCR.

b. Make recommendations, provide guidance and direction, or direct additional analysis

c. Establish tripwires and comebacks as appropriate

7. If needed, the FCB Chair can direct a change in the JSD to ensure appropriate levels of awareness and the efficient use of senior leader time. The FCB Chair will review JSD criteria and make a final determination, taking into consideration the recommendations of JROC members and advisors. If the requirements sponsor nonconcurs with a JSD change as directed by the FCB Chair, they can petition the JCB Chair for a change to the JSD via submission of an MFR to J-8/DDRCD.

(c) JCB Brief (10 Business Days)

1. For documents with a JSD of JCB Interest or higher, the JCB will be briefed not later than (NLT) 10 business days after the FCB.

2. The only staffing that will take place between the FCB and JCB is a staffing of the draft JROCM. Requirements documents will not be staffed after the FCB stage.

3. The JCB will focus discussion on the items listed in paragraphs 2.c.(1)(b)1. and 2.c.(1)(b)2 of this enclosure. Stakeholders are encouraged to voice dissenting opinions or issues unresolved from staffing at the FCB. Dissenting opinions will be documented and provided the JROC for awareness. The JCB may also discuss guidance/direction post-staffing as well as alignment to PBR.

4. For items with a JSD of JCB Interest, the JCB Chair will complete the review process and sign the JROCM. The JROCM will:

a. For Service/component requirements, endorse or reject the capability as addressing a JFR/JCR. For joint requirements, approve or reject the JFR/JCR.

b. Make recommendations, provide guidance and direction, or direct additional analysis

c. Establish tripwires and comebacks as appropriate.

5. The JCB Chair can direct a change in the JSD to ensure appropriate levels of awareness and the efficient use of senior leader time. If the requirements sponsor nonconcurs with a JSD change as directed by the JCB Chair, they can petition the JROC Chair for a change to the JSD via submission of an MFR to J-8/DDRCD.

(d) JROC Brief (10 Business Days)

1. For documents with a JSD of JROC Interest, the JROC will be briefed NLT 10 business days after the JCB.

2. The only staffing that will take place between the JCB and JROC is staffing of the draft JROCM. Requirements documents will not be staffed after the FCB stage.

3. The JROC will focus discussion on the items listed in paragraphs 2.c.(1)(b)1. and 2.c.(1)(b)2. of this enclosure. Stakeholders are encouraged to voice dissenting opinions or issues unresolved from staffing at the JCB. The JROC may also discuss guidance/direction post-staffing, including nominating topics to the RRAB as well as alignment to PBR.

4. For items with a JSD of JROC Interest, the JROC Chair will complete the review process and sign the JROCM. The JROCM will:

a. For Service/component requirements, endorse or reject the capability as addressing a JFR/JCR. For joint requirements, approve or reject the JFR/JCR.

b. Make recommendations, provide guidance and direction, or direct additional analysis

c. Establish tripwires and comebacks as appropriate

(e) The JRC may consider requests from sponsors for extensions to staffing timelines. In order to ensure proper consideration, sponsors should provide valid reasons for these requests. Extensions, if approved, will be documented as a KM/DS note. A sponsor may withdraw a document provided to the JRC, or from staffing, at any time after submission with notification to the JRC. If this occurs and the sponsor wants to re-submit the document, it will enter the process as a new document.



Figure 4. JFRP Staffing Process

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ENCLOSURE C

JOINT FORCE REQUIREMENTS PROCESS
REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENTATION

1. Joint Force Requirements Documents. The following documents are considered JFR documents:

a. CRDs.

b. JDCR.

c. CDR.

2. Purpose

a. Capstone Requirements Documents. Capstone Requirements provide top-down unified and overarching guidance to the Joint Force to align and enable continuous modernization and integration of bottom-up developed capabilities. Capstone Requirements identify the Joint Force needs, but do not prescribe how to execute the supporting capability development. Capstone Requirements provide capability developers a unified, joint perspective to focus resources and efforts. Capstone Requirements capture JCRs and prioritize them within a portfolio for iterative analysis under the DoW's CPM process.

b. Joint DCRs. The JDCR is the mechanism to identify and approve non-materiel approaches to closing capability gaps and meeting joint force requirements. The purpose of a JDCR is to propose non-materiel capability solutions that may serve as an alternative to, or complement of, materiel capability solutions. A JDCR may be generated in response to and in support of other JROC functions (i.e., JFD, JCI, CCMD Requirements, CPM) when non-materiel approaches appear to be the most viable solution for identified capability gaps. JDCRs may be submitted by any Service or component. After submission, JDCRs are staffed according the JFRP staffing process. In approving a JDCR, the JROC or subordinate boards:

(1) Approves the proposed non-materiel capability solutions fulfill a gap in joint military capabilities or are otherwise necessary to meet applicable requirements in the NDS and derived documentation.

(2) Approves the document and supporting data contained therein, including the change recommendations and implementation plans.

(3) Assigns an office of primary responsibility (OPR) to accomplish each action listed in the implementation plan.

c. CCMD Derived Requirement. The purpose of a CDR is to document JFRs/JCRs and associated capability gaps in cases where the CCDR deems the operational risk of unmitigated capability gaps to be unacceptable. It provides traceability to the operational context, threats, and other relevant factors that determine the joint military capabilities. CDRs are Service, solution, and cost agnostic and specify one or more JCRs (task, condition, standards statement).

3. Joint Force Requirements Documents Formats

a. JFR documents will contain the following information:

(1) Cover Page. Required for all, with additional details for CDR.

(2) Executive Summary. Required for all.

(3) Section 1: Operational Context. Required for all, with additional details for CDR.

(4) Section 2: Threat Summary. Required for all, with additional details for CDR.

(5) Section 3: Joint Capability Requirements and Gaps. Required for all, with additional details for CDR and JDCR.

(6) Section 4: Interoperability. Required for CRD and CDR. Not applicable for JDCR.

(7) Section 5: Final Recommendations/Implementation Plans. Required for all, with additional details for JDCR.

b. Cover Page

(1) The cover page should include the following information:

(a) Title of the document.

(b) Sponsoring organization.

(c) Proposed JSD.

(d) Proposed lead FCB.

(e) Date submitted to the Joint Staff.

(f) Point of contact (POC) information (name, e-mail, phone number).

(2) This section is required for all document types and should be written to the most accessible classification level possible. For CDRs, include the proposed Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) and recommended solution sponsor.

c. Executive Summary

(1) Provide a concise summary of the document, not to exceed one page. The summary should include:

(a) A high-level overview of the JCRs and gaps.

(b) Key recommendations or proposed solutions,

(2) This section is required for all document types and should be written to the most accessible classification level possible.

d. Section 1: Operational Context

(1) The purpose of this section is to provide operational context and conceptual basis for the capability/change identified. Operational context should be based on current plans and/or future concepts and explain how the capability or change contributes to the missions and activities of the Joint Force. This section should identify what measurable operational outcomes are required; what effects must be produced to achieve those outcomes; how they complement the integrated joint/multinational warfighting force; and what enabling capabilities are required to achieve the desired operational outcomes.

(2) This section is required for all document types. For CDRs, identify measurable operational outcomes, effects required to achieve those outcomes, and enabling capabilities.

e. Section 2: Threat Summary

(1) The purpose of this section is to ensure that JCRs and the associated capability gaps are based on consistent threat environment information and

references. Sponsors must provide traceability to the most current DIA- or Service-approved threat products used to support their analysis. Identify all anticipated capabilities that adversaries might employ against the capability being reviewed and provide sufficient information and analysis from the supporting Defense Intelligence All-Source Analysis Enterprise production element.

(2) This section is required for CRDs and CDRs. It is optional for JDCRs, depending on the nature of the recommendations. Tailor the content based on the specific document type. For CDRs, cite any threat-sensitive KPP-related CIPs, either as approved CIPs or as proposed new CIPs for review and approval in conjunction with CDR validation.

f. Section 3: Joint Capability Requirements and Gaps

(1) The purpose of this section is to identify the JCRs addressed or enabled by the capability/change, and to clearly and succinctly describe the capability gap the recommended changes will mitigate or close if implemented.

(2) JCRs must be general enough so as not to create the appearance of a predetermined capability solution or solution approach (e.g., new system, Family of Systems, System of Systems) but specific enough to evaluate alternative means to achieve the capability. Define JCRs using the format: "The ability to [perform a task (UJT or Service Task) Operational Activity] against/given a [Threat] in order to achieve [Effect] in a/under [Environmental Conditions] per the [Standard of Performance]."

(3) This section is required for all document types. Tailor the content based on the specific document type. For CRDs, specify JCRs and assess associated capability gaps in terms of a comparison between the JCR and current or future capability solutions available to the Joint Force. For JDCRs, clearly describe the capability gap the recommended changes will mitigate or close.

g. Section 4: Interoperability

(1) Describe impacts to Joint or Service FDD; any anticipated interactions or interdependencies with other systems, including potential impacts on joint or multinational operations and dependencies on other systems or capabilities; and DOTmLPF-P impacts. See reference (w) for more information.

(2) This section is required for CRDs and CDRs. It is not applicable for a JDCR.

h. Section 5: Final Recommendations and Implementation Plans

(1) The purpose of this section is to identify one or more paths forward to satisfy the JCRs and close or mitigate associated capability gaps identified in the document. Ensure recommendations reflect a thorough understanding of the threat considerations, intelligence support requirements, and capabilities for the functional and operational areas. Address all DOTmLPF-P components to be considered as part of a materiel solution and independent of a materiel solution.

(2) This section is required for all document types. Tailor the content based on the specific document type. For JDCRs, include a POA&M with start times, major milestones, and completion dates as well as an approximation of total required resources. The FCBs are responsible for coordinating assigned tasks with the sponsor or designated lead organization, and for providing periodic updates on implementation progress to the O-6 and GO/FO Integration Groups. An MFR will be routed to the final review authority once all JDCR tasks are complete and archived in KM/DS.

4. JUON and JEON Document Formats

a. Section 1: Administrative Data

(1) Name. The naming convention will be as follows: JUON or JEON (as appropriate) – CCMD Abbreviation – FY of submission – # for order of submission by the solution sponsor, short description of required capability.

(2) Identified By. Release authority's name, rank, and title. JUONs/ JEONs must be authorized by either the CCDR or the Deputy CCDR.

(3) Primary and secondary POCs. Include name, title/rank, phone, and both NIPRNET and SIPRNET e-mail addresses.

b. Section 2: Operation Context and Threat Analysis

(1) This section must demonstrate how the request satisfies JUON/ JEON Criteria #1 and #2, addressing both the threat and operational deficiency; include what cannot be done without a new or improved capability solution; identify where the operational deficiency exists and clearly describe the mission deficiency or capability gap; describe in detail the nature of the

urgency and the operational impact, if not immediately resolved, would result in loss of life that require additional forces to accomplish assigned contingency plan mission objectives or mission failure of an ongoing or anticipated contingency operation; and provide a CONOPS for which the capabilities requested in the JUON or JEON contribute, including information regarding the coalition environment within which the capability solution will need to operate. Sponsors must also provide traceability to approved threat products used to support their JOUN or JEON.

c. Section 3: Required Capability. Clearly define the required capabilities, distinct from potential solutions to be addressed later. Specify whether these capabilities support a discrete operation or are suited for sustainment and integration into JFDD. Articulate the requirements precisely within the operational context, avoiding broad or vague requests. Include the latest acceptable date for addressing the capability gaps.

d. Section 4: Flexibility. Specify whether a partial capability solution delivered on schedule is preferable to a delayed solution that meets more of the requirement. Provide estimates for acceptable performance reductions and allowable delay timeframes.

e. Section 5: Potential Non-Materiel Capability Solutions. Address Criterion #3 by explaining why changes to current DOTmLPF-P with existing capabilities are insufficient to mitigate the risk. Detail any non-materiel options considered and why they fail to fully or only partially address the JCR.

f. Section 6: Potential Materiel Capability Solutions. If known, identify viable capability solutions—including those from other Services, U.S. Government agencies, A&P, or commercial sources—that could enhance operational capabilities or system or human performance. Address potential impacts on Human Systems Integration, which includes human factors engineering, safety, survivability, personnel, training, logistics, and communications. If applicable, include details from market surveys or related research conducted during the validation process. Provide market research details with the JUON or JEON to support urgent capability acquisition.

g. Section 7: Required Quantities. Specify the required quantities for materiel capability solutions, including distribution across applicable Services and components. Total quantities must account for operational inventory, training, spares, scheduled repair/overhaul, and anticipated attrition over the lifecycle to maintain operational inventory.

h. Section 8: Limitations. Identify any known limitations that may hinder addressing the JCR, including arms control treaties, logistics support, transportation, manpower, training, existing regulations, policies, guidance, or other non-military barriers.

5. Assessment of Operational Utility

a. The AOU is documented in memo format and includes the following sections:

(1) Header Information. Include date, original requirement/source document, validation date, assessing organization (requirement sponsor) and POC information, capability solution being assessed, and solution organization (solution sponsor) and POC information.

(2) Assessment Period. Specify the initial delivery date and the assessment timeframe. Submit the AOU to the JRC within 6 months of fielding. If the solution fails to deliver operational utility, an earlier submission is allowed. Delays must be justified to the JRC.

(3) Assessment Description. Describe the operational environment.

(4) Conclusion. Categorize the assessment as one of the following:

(a) Failure/Limited Success. The capability does not meet operational utility requirements. Confirm whether the original requirements remain valid or require changes.

(b) Success/Limited Duration Requirement. The capability meets the urgent/emergent requirement for the specified duration.

(c) Success/Enduring Requirement. The capability meets the requirement and provides enduring utility for the Joint Force.

1. Required Capability/Performance. State whether all requirements are met. Identify any shortfalls or limitations.

2. Changes to CONOPS, Missions, and/or Threats. Note any changes in Joint Force usage or adversary capabilities or TTPs since fielding. If none, state “None.”

3. Changes to Estimated Quantities. Provide updated quantity estimates if usage exceeds original projections. If unchanged, state "Same as identified in JUON or JEON."

4. Changes to Anticipated Sustainment Duration. Update sustainment timeframes if broader utility or longer duration is identified. If unchanged, state "Same as identified in JUON or JEON."

5. Other Issues/Considerations. Highlight issues such as training, interoperability, system security, environmental factors, or licensing concerns.

6. Additional Opportunities. Identify opportunities for broader Joint Force utility.

7. Testing Data. Summarize any testing conducted, including results and planned follow-up testing. Include detailed test data as an appendix if applicable.

8. Lessons Learned. Provide insight gained during the operational assessment.

(d) Authorized by. Provide the release authority's name, rank, and title. AOUs must be endorsed by the Commander, Vice/Deputy Commander, Chief of Staff, or J-8 Director of the CCMD.

ENCLOSURE D

JOINT FORCE REQUIREMENTS PROCESS MISCELLANEOUS SUPPORTING PROCESSES AND TOOLS

1. Joint Capability Areas

a. JCAs provide a common capabilities language for use across the DoW. JCAs provide portfolio structure to organize CRs and capability gaps into sub-portfolios and to align those sub-portfolios to the FCBs. This enables the FCBs to apply their respective functional expertise to conduct analysis of capability solutions.

b. JCA Definitions. JCAs are defined as "collections of DoD capabilities functionally grouped to support capability analysis, strategy development, investment decision making, CPM, and capabilities-based force development and operational planning." IAW reference (x), there are seven Tier 1 JCAs, including:

(1) Force Development and Design.

(2) Battlespace Awareness.

(3) Force Application.

(4) Logistics and Sustainment.

(5) Command and Control.

(6) Joint Information.

(7) Protection.

c. Each Tier 1 JCA has supporting Tier 2, Tier 3, and, in some cases, Tier 4 JCAs, which provide greater fidelity into capability areas. Additional information on JCAs, including the complete taxonomy and JCA definitions, can be found at <https://intellipedia.intelink.gov/wiki/Joint_Capability_Areas>.

d. JCA Management. The JROC is the approval authority for changes to taxonomy at the Tier 1 and Tier 2 levels. The JCB is the approval authority for all other changes to the JCAs, including Tier 3 and Tier 4 taxonomy as well as definitions.

e. The FCBs manage capabilities within joint functions IAW Table 3.

Functional Capabilities Board	Joint Function	J-Dir	JCA
Intelligence FCB	Intelligence	J-2	Battlespace Awareness
Information FCB	Information	J-3	Joint Information
Sustainment FCB	Sustainment	J-4	Logistics and Sustainment
C4/Cyber FCB	Information	J-6	Joint Information
	Command and Control		Command and Control
Force Development and Design FCB	N/A	J-7	Force Development and Design
Protection FCB	Protection	J-8	Protection
Fires and Maneuver FCB	Fires	J-8	Force Application
	Movement and Maneuver	J-8	

Table 3. FCB Alignment to Joint Functions, J-Dirs, and JCAs

(1) JCA Development. JCAs will have concise, descriptive titles and authoritative definitions that begin with "the ability to." JCAs are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, yet will avoid specific scenarios, program language, and solutions/systems. To the greatest extent possible, the JCA definition will use terminology from joint doctrine and DoD publications. JCAs will be developed to at least Tier 3, and the decomposition of lower tiers will aggregate to the whole of the higher tier.

(2) JCA Review. J-8/DDRCD will conduct a biennial review to consider changes to the approved JCA taxonomy and definitions. Change requests submitted between reviews will not be considered to minimize disruption to ongoing JROC business.

2. Metrics

a. The JFRP requires clear process and outcome metrics to measure effectiveness and efficiency of delivering capability to the warfighter. The JFRP will collect and actively measure the following metrics:

(1) Measures of Performance

(a) Number of Joint Force requirements reviewed and approved.

(b) Timeline of Joint Force requirements review and approval (number of days from submission to JROCM).

(c) JUON/JEON approval and fielding timelines.

(d) Number of meetings (FCBs, JCBs, JROCs (live and paper)).

(e) Percentage of tasks completed (as a percentage of JROC assigned tasks within JROC prescribed timelines).

(f) End-user perceptions (assessed as qualitative and quantitative feedback from requirements, acquisition, and operational stakeholders).

(2) Measures of Effectiveness

(a) Time-to-field of capabilities.

(b) Interoperability across the Joint Force.

(c) Impacts to Service/component Requirements.

(d) Change in percentage of Service/component requirements directly traceable to high priority joint capability documentation.

(e) Percentage change, year-over-year, of total funding allocated to joint priorities.

(f) Change in percentage of CCMD gaps closed within specific timelines.

(g) Risk to NMS/JWC execution (change in percentage of NMS/JWC execution objectives assessed as “low risk” through portfolio management activities resolving critical gaps).

b. The above MOPs and MOEs will be continuously tracked and reported to the JROC/JCB on a quarterly basis. Digital tools such as the JFRP App and Resourcing to Requirements Data Dashboard (R2D2) will be leveraged for continuous metric tracking and to enable real-time leadership insights.

c. In addition to the quantitative metrics above, qualitative feedback will be regularly solicited from the requirements management community and be iteratively incorporated to improve the joint requirements process. Feedback can be provided at the JROC/JCB, the GO/FO and O-6 integration meetings, the JROC Offsite, or in an ad hoc fashion. Joint requirements processes, including supporting guides or TTPs, will be improved in real-time based on

feedback. Additionally, this Manual will be updated no less than every 2 years to ensure continuous process improvement.

3. Digital Tools

a. The JFRP employs digital tools and data environments that link requirements analysis to mission engineering results and industry experiments for greater transparency and speed. Three digital tools currently exist or are in development to support the JFRP: KM/DS, the JFRP App, and R2D2. Until replaced by a more advanced and capable system, KM/DS will remain the primary and authoritative source for all JFRP data.

b. Knowledge Management/Decision Support System

(1) KM/DS is the primary, authoritative data base for all approved Service, component, and joint capability/requirements documents. The JRC oversees flow of requirements data in KM/DS, and coordinates closely with Services, components, and the JROC Secretariat to ensure that Service- and component-validated requirements flow through the JFRP to enable Joint Force awareness of all requirements and capabilities being developed in support of the Joint Force. The KM/DS is located on SIPRNET at <https://jrockmdsbpm.osd.smil.mil.>

(2) Scheduling. KM/DS serves as the official means for scheduling and posting the schedules for all O-6 Integration Meetings, GO/FO Integration Meetings, FCB WGs, FCBs, JCBs, and JROCs.

(3) Data Repository. IAW reference (i) all approved Service/component/joint requirements documents—regardless of acquisitions pathway and JSD—are required to be uploaded into KM/DS. Similarly, all CCMD identified gaps included in the IPL will be loaded into KM/DS. All approved JROCMs and data requested by the JROC as comebacks or tasks within JROCMs will be loaded into KM/DS. KM/DS provides a graphical representation of all KM/DS packages processed since 2013.

c. Joint Force Requirements Process Application

(1) The JFRP App (located on SIPRNET at <https://JROC.c3.advana.data.smil.mil>), formerly known as the JROC Dashboard, is the Joint Staff's primary strategic assessment and analysis tool for managing the JFRP. It was developed to strengthen the DoW's ability to identify, prioritize, and resource Joint Force capabilities by providing strategic insights, performance metrics, and rigorous analytical tools. The JFRP App provides functionality for

executive leadership and action officer (AO) analysis over the full repository of Service and component requirements. Though primarily used on SIPRNET, a version of the JFRP App is also available on JWICS.

(2) The JFRP App empowers the users to rapidly identify and overcome critical challenges in capability development by centralizing and streamlining access to fragmented metadata and requirements from KM/DS. The JFRP App enables comprehensive visualizations and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) of JFRs and gaps information that enables analysis by the user through a wide variety of lenses. Users are provided with standardized methods for evaluating schedule status and quantifying capabilities-based risk to ensure effective, timely development of required capabilities.

(3) The JFRP App provides workflows to ensure capability development is aligned to the most urgent needs of the Joint Force. The tool provides automated identification of strategically important items and robust functionality to analyze gaps and requirements within the context of the NDS, NMS, JOPs, JWC KOPs and CRCs. The JFRP App, used in conjunction with R2D2, can quickly identify misaligned investment strategies and risks posed by under or over investment in capabilities. The JFRP App also includes a specific JUON/JEON management tool to track, assess, and adjudicate urgent and emergent needs with greater speed and visibility.

(4) The JFRP App features a comprehensive set of tools for AOs, including dashboards to effectively assess portfolio status, alerts and workflows to manage and execute tasks, and automated reporting to streamline communications. The JFRP App supports AOs in achieving efficiency and cross-organization alignment by providing automated methods for highlighting overlapping or redundant capabilities.

(5) Alongside purpose-built tools for executives and AOs, the JFRP App provides flexible and accessible search and reasoning capabilities through Generative AI incorporating large language models with access and familiarity with all documents contained within KM/DS. The JFRP App automates extraction of insights from document artifacts and enhances search capabilities beyond strict keyword matching to significantly reduce the time and effort required for executive decision-making and AO analysis.

(6) JFRP Application Key Features

(a) Generative AI for rapid and accurate search and analysis of all documents within KM/DS.

(b) Centralized access to all requirements and capability gaps.

(c) Dashboards with status and risk information by organizational and strategic constructs.

(d) KPIs and visualizations for process management.

(e) Quantification and visualization of capability alignment to key DoW strategies.

(f) Assessment of similar capabilities to support efficiency.

(g) Reporting, task management, and collaboration tools.

d. Resourcing to Requirements Data Dashboard

(1) R2D2 is an initiative led by J-8/PBAD to establish connections between validated Service and component Joint Force requirements and the capability solutions provided by the Services and some components. This tool supports the Joint Staff in advocating for resourcing and acceleration of critical Joint Force warfighting capabilities. R2D2 can also support the Services in understanding their contributions to the Joint Force and identify areas for investment or divestment.

(2) R2D2 leverages artificial intelligence and machine learning against diverse data sources, including requirements data from KM/DS and budgetary information. Its dashboards can assist the identification of JCRs that are over-resourced or under-resourced. R2D2 informs CPM and JFDD efforts, establishing data-driven analysis for processes such as PPBE, CPMR, and JROC recommendations for the RRAB, by aligning acquisition programs with Joint Force requirements and funding data.

(3) R2D2 is located on SIPRNET at <https://qlik.advana.data.smil.mil/sense/app/d8ff0afe-004e-4333-a82d-f7289bbfcc73>.

4. Data Governance

a. The JFRP is a multi-faceted, analysis-driven process with activities distributed across the Joint Staff, OSW, CCMDs, and Services. This process critically relies on continuous integration and active data management across multiple organizations for comprehensive and timely analysis. Managing data as a strategic asset is the key to unlocking decision advantage for development of the future Joint Force (see reference (y)). Proactive data governance will

establish executive visibility into JFRP performance, effectiveness, and data-related risks, as well as promote continuous process improvement with accountable data management.

b. Data governance is the continuous planning, monitoring, and enforcement over management of data assets. The JFRP will utilize the existing Joint Staff governance bodies to manage the federated ownership of JFRP data standards, policies, and procedures. The JFRP will establish key touchpoints for data-related collaboration, advocacy, and issue resolution and provide a framework for each JFRP component to responsibly manage their data.

c. Effective JFRP data governance cannot be achieved immediately and only through continuous improvement and executive sponsorship will its impact be achieved. As JFRP data governance matures, this section of the manual will be refined to clarify guidance and procedures. Joint requirements processes, including supporting guides or TTPs, will be continuously improved based on feedback and the JFRP manual will be updated no less than every 2 years to ensure continuous process improvement.

d. JFRP Data Stewardship

(1) JFRP Data Stewards will be formally identified for all JFRP components, data assets, and work products. Formalization of existing roles as data stewards will enable process-stakeholders to clarify data-specific responsibilities and efficiently communicate across organizations. JFRP Data Stewards will drive the management of data as a strategic asset and an executive-level understanding of process component activities by comprehensively mapping all relevant data (i.e., process inputs and outputs) to the JFRP process to maximize data security, access, integration, analysis, and issue resolution.

(2) The following individuals serve as JFRP Data Stewards:

(a) The Chief Data Steward for the Joint Staff is the Joint Staff Chief Data Officer (CDO). The Joint Staff CDO establishes and communicates the Joint Staff's organizational data strategy, including standards for data management, access, and quality monitoring. The CDO sponsors data governance development activities and measures effectiveness of data management practices against business outcomes.

(b) The JFRP Executive Data Steward is J-8/DDRCD. J-8/DDRCD oversees the implementation and iteration of data management policies and metrics of quality, performance, and effectiveness within all components of the JFRP.

(c) JFRP Business Data Stewards are the individual leads for each process component (e.g., JCD AOs, FCBs Leads and AOs, Service/component Gatekeepers). As subject matter experts within their domain, JFRP Business Data Stewards are responsible for the implementation of data management policies in coordination with the JFRP Executive Data Steward. JFRP Business Data Stewards establish and report data-driven measures of component performance and effectives to the JFRP Executive Data Steward.

(d) JFRP Technical Data Stewards are the analysts, engineers, and data system administrators that support the JFRP Business Data Stewards in the execution of their respective process component responsibilities. They manage IT systems and the storage, flow, and transformation of data to measure and maximize component performance and effectiveness.

(3) JFRP Data Stewards are responsible for the creation, maintenance, and dissemination of documentation pertaining to the business rules, data policies, standards, definitions, and quality measures for the activities and data assets within their domain. JFRP Data Steward activities include:

(a) Data Discovery and Business Alignment. JFRP Data Stewards are responsible for creating and maintaining process documentation to communicate essential data inputs to component activities, data standards and accessibility of respective work products, and measures of data quality and component performance. JFRP data includes any input required to execute JFRP component duties or work products generated by a JFRP component, including unstructured text (e.g., requirements documents, analytical reports), document metadata (e.g., authors, ledgers of activity, content tags), reference data (e.g., JCA taxonomy, NMS, AJA, JWC, UJTL), terminology glossaries, and documentation of JFRP data management policies, procedures, and standards.

(b) Cross-Organizational Touchpoints. JFRP Data Stewards promote executive visibility into data management activities, coordinate data integration activity across JFRP components, and identify opportunities further process improvement. Data-related challenges and blockers that negatively affecting the performance and effectiveness of the JFRP, accompanied by proposed solutions, will be presented at the monthly JFRP GO/FO meeting and JROC Offsite. As is inherent in the role of each data steward, it is expected that JFRP Data Stewards continuously engage in coordination of data-related activities and communicate issues to relevant process stakeholders on an as-needed basis.

(c) Process Data Quality, Performance, and Effectiveness. JFRP Data Stewards measure, manage, and resolve JFRP data quality issues as they are identified at the lowest possible level within their respective organizations, only escalating when necessary. JFRP data quality and process metrics will be continuously managed. New measures will be continuously incorporated as the JFRP matures while outdated or useless measures will be eliminated. Each JFRP component's measures of data quality, process performance, and process effectiveness will be transparent, accurate, and consumable by any stakeholder across the JFRP.

5. Training

a. Requirements Management Certification Training. By congressional mandate (reference (z)), all DoW military, civilian, and contractor personnel responsible for identifying warfighter capabilities and generating requirements for MDAPs must be certified. The Requirements Management Certification Training (RMCT) program is administered by Warfighting Acquisition University (WAU) Defense Systems Management College on behalf of and in conjunction with OUSW(A&S) and J-8/DDRCD.

b. Certification Levels. DoW uses four levels of Requirements Management Certification: A, B, C, and D. Individuals filling positions/billets within a DoW component whose responsibilities are commensurate with the guidelines below will be trained to the level associated with those responsibilities. Figure 5 summarizes the relationship between RM certification levels, associated training, as well as a summary of the duties, although there may be variation between the Services and agencies.

(2) Level 0 (Zero) – Foundational. Provide administrative support to the requirements management workforce; requires a general knowledge and understanding of the terms of reference and the functions of the requirements workforce.

(3) Level A – Journeyman. Contribute to requirements generation and capability development in various capacities, to include: stating users' needs, analysis, subject matter or domain expertise, document staffing and coordination, and administrative support.

(4) Level B – Practitioner. Write requirements and requirements documents; fill specific capacities, to include: lead study elements, adjudicate comments, facilitate document development and coordination across organizations, and consolidate a Service/agency position on a program/ requirements document.

(5) Level C – Manager. Support the creation and staffing of requirements documents; train others on "Big A" acquisition topics; represent Services, agencies, or CCMDs in requirements, acquisition, or resourcing forums; support presentations at Service-level or FCBs; lead or coordinate activities focused on requirements generation and capability development, including, but not limited to: writing and editing requirements documents, participating in requirements-related IPTs, playing a significant role in requirements-related studies and analysis.

(6) Level D – Executive (GO/FO/SES level). Approve requirements documents; provide senior leadership and oversight of JFRP analysis and staffing; enforce standards and accountability.

RQM 1010 *Foundational* Introduction to Joint Requirements	RQM 1101 *Journeyman* Core Concepts for Requirements Management	RQM 2100 *Practitioner* Application Skills for Requirements Management	RQM 3100V *Manager* Advanced Concepts & Skills for Requirements Managers	RQM 4030V *Executive* Requirements Executive Overview	RQM 4130 *Executive* Senior Leader Requirements Course
4 – 6 Hours	8 – 10 Hours	8 – 12 Hours	36 Hours	1 Day	Tailored
0, (Optional A – D)	A, B, C	B, C	C	D (1-3 Star / SES)	D (4-Star / Agency Head)

0	*"Foundational" - Requirements Support* – Provide administrative support to the requirements management workforce, require a general knowledge/understanding of the terms of reference and the functions of the requirements process
A	*"Journeyman" - Requirements Originators & Support* – Contribute to Requirements generation and capability development in various capacities include: Stating users' needs, analysis, subject matter or domain expertise, document staffing and coordination, administrative support
B	*"Practitioner" - Requirements Writers & Developers* – Write requirements and requirements documents; Fill specific capacities to include: Lead study elements, adjudicate comments, facilitate document development and coordination across organizations, and consolidate a Service/Agency position on a program/requirements document
C	*"Manager" - Requirements Managers & Core Expertise* – Support the creation, staffing, or validation of requirements documents; Train others on "Big A" acquisition topics; Represent Services, Agencies, or CCMDs in requirements, acquisition, or resourcing forums; Support presentations at FCBs or at Service-level Requirements Councils
D	*"Executive" - Requirements Validators & Prioritizors* at the GO/FO/SES level – Validate and approve documents; Provide senior leadership and oversight of joint requirements analysis and staffing; Enforce requirements standards/accountability

Figure 5. WAU RMCT Framework and Skills Required

c. Training Courses. RMCT joint training standards and associated information are located in the WAU iCatalog, which contains information regarding RMCT levels/skills required, courses, certification standards, how to enroll/register, governance, and additional supporting information. The iCatalog can be found at <https://icatalog.dau.edu/onlinecatalog/CareerLvL.aspx>.

ENCLOSURE E

JOINT FORCE REQUIREMENTS PROCESS AND JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL PARALLEL PROCESSES

1. Service/Component Requirements Integration

a. Service/Component Responsibility. Under the JFRP, the Services/components are responsible for generating and validating their own requirements. The JROC will cease validation of Service/component requirements documents to streamline and accelerate the delivery of capabilities to the warfighter by cutting red tape and empowering the Services/components to execute their Title 10 responsibilities.

b. Service/Component Process and Documents. The Services/components will manage their requirements through their own oversight boards, such as the Army Requirements Oversight Council or the Marine Requirements Oversight Council and will leverage Service/component-specific requirements processes for staffing and validation. Additionally, the Services/components will leverage their own Service-specific requirements documentation, such as the Air Force's Strategic Requirements Document or the Navy's Top-Level Requirements document, determining format and content that meets their needs, balances efficiency and effectiveness, and allows for appropriate due diligence and oversight. If desired, Services may leverage current or previous joint documentation content or formats, but they are not required to do so.

c. Key Information. While Service/component requirements documentation formats will not be prescribed, the JROC will review key elements for the purpose of JCI, including:

(1) Operational Context

(a) Joint and/or component task.

(b) CONOPS/CONEMP.

(2) Threat/Intelligence

(a) Service Intelligence Center/DIA-approved Threat Assessment.

(b) CIPs (if applicable).

(c) Intelligence Supportability (if applicable).

(2) Requirements

(a) CRs and/or Performance Attributes.

(b) Traceability to joint and/or component requirements and gaps.

(c) TRLs and MRLs.

(d) Projected cost, schedule, and quantity.

(3) Integration

(a) Impacts to joint and/or Service FDD.

(b) Joint Interoperability.

(c) Inter-Service dependencies and capabilities provided.

(d) Joint DOTmLPF-P Impacts.

d. JCI will occur after Service/component requirements validation and in parallel with Service acquisition processes to prevent unnecessary time delays to capability development and delivery. JCI will be conducted in a minimally invasive and accelerated fashion while ensuring appropriate joint awareness, integration, and due diligence.

2. Performance Attribute Certifications/Endorsements

a. Guidance. In concert with the delegation of Service/component requirement validation authority, the Services/components are responsible for all performance attribute certifications and endorsements. Service/component requirements and acquisition boards and processes must take the following considerations into account until changes in law or policy are implemented:

(1) Joint Interoperability. IAW reference (aa), "Program Managers/ sponsors must identify measurable interoperability requirements for each information technology (IT) in development. Requirements are validated through net-ready certification and verified through test and evaluation as part of the joint interoperability certification." The CJCS "determines which IT has such requirements" and "serves as the net-ready certification authority for all IT with joint interoperability requirements." Joint interoperability includes elements of physical interoperability and compliance with such IT standards as the DoW Chief Information Officer may establish reference (bb). See reference

(w) for more information. OPR: Joint Staff Directorate for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers/Cyber, J-6; C4/Cyber FCB.

(2) Intelligence Supportability and Threat Approval. IAW reference (cc), "The Secretary of each military department shall coordinate with elements of the IC with respect to the specification, identification, development, and maintenance of major system interfaces and standards for use in major system platforms." Additionally, IAW reference (dd), milestone decisions authorities "shall ensure that these acquisition strategies consider the integration of current intelligence assessments into the acquisition process." See the Threat and Intelligence Certification Guide on KM/DS for more information. OPR: Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2; Intelligence FCB.

(3) Sustainment. The Sustainment performance attribute was authorized in reference (ee). IAW reference (ff), the SecWar shall "ensure that the defense acquisition system gives ample emphasis to sustainment" and "ensure that reliability and maintainability are included in the performance attributes of the key performance parameter on sustainment during the development of capabilities requirements." OPR: Joint Staff Directorate for Logistics, J-4; Sustainment FCB.

(4) Energy. The Energy performance attribute was authorized in reference (gg). IAW references (hh) and (ii), the SecWar "shall develop and implement a methodology to enable the implementation of a fuel efficiency key performance parameter in the requirements development process for the modification of existing or development of new fuel consuming systems." The Director of Operational Energy Plans and Programs shall "coordinate and oversee planning and program activities of the Department of War related to … the consideration of operational energy demands in defense planning, requirements, and acquisition processes." Additionally, energy requirements will be developed IAW USW(A&S) guidance. OPR: Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of War for Energy Resilience & Optimization

(5) Force Protection and System Survivability. The Force Protection and System Survivability performance attributes were authorized in reference (jj), which stated that "requirements for key performance parameters for force protection and survivability shall be included as part of the documentation of system requirements for any such system." While this legislative language was repealed by reference (kk), these performance attributes remain in effect IAW reference (ll), until otherwise updated or rescinded. OPR: Joint Staff J-8, Protection FCB; OCR: Joint Staff J-6; C4/Cyber FCB (Cyber Survivability Endorsement).

(6) Exportability. IAW reference (mm), the SecWar shall "secure exportability as a requirement in the early stages of the acquisition process." IAW reference (nn), "PMs will integrate international acquisition and exportability planning into the program's acquisition strategy beginning at the entry milestone and continuing through all phases of the acquisition process." Pursuant to reference (oo), "allied/partner interoperability and coalition use" will be incorporated into relevant requirements documents. OPR: Joint Staff Directorate for Strategy, Plans, and Policy, J-5.

b. Support and Coordination. If requested by the Services/components, the Joint Staff will provide support and coordination to the Services in addressing the key performance parameters described above. FCBs can serve as SMEs on performance attribute certifications, share best practices, recommend process improvements, and/or train/advise/assist Services and components in KPP certifications or similar processes. Such support would prevent the Services from having to replicate existing organizations and processes, but is purely voluntarily at the discretion of the Services.

c. JROC Review. Given the inherently joint nature of interoperability and intelligence supportability, the JROC (or subordinate board) will review Service/ component completion of these certifications or similar processes during JCI for documents with a JSD of FCB Interest or higher. If not completed to the satisfaction of the JROC Chair, the JROC will recommend Services/ components conduct these certifications or similar processes to ensure capabilities are sufficiently interoperable and supportable. Additionally, JROC stakeholders will be allowed to provide information only comments to requirements sponsors during JCI regarding completion status of other certifications or endorsements or similar processes during the Service/ component requirements processes.

d. If requested by the Services/components, the Joint Staff or other DoW entities can assist with certification as part of Service/component requirements approval (e.g., Net Ready Certification, Intelligence Certification, Cyber Survivability Endorsement).

3. Intelligence Community Integration

a. The IC leverages the ICCR Process for the development of CRs for IC major systems acquisition, funded in whole or mostly by the National Intelligence Program (NIP), including those where the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) has delegated MDA to an IC element (reference (pp)).

b. The primary output of this process is a Statement of Capability, which describes the essential elements of the proposed capability and its ability to satisfy the needs of the IC. The IC requirements process is governed by various policy documents, such as the IC PPBE system, IC Policy Guidance on Acquisition, and the DNI–SecWar Memorandum of Agreement on acquisition programs executed at DoW on IC elements. The Intelligence FCB coordinates the intersection between the ICCR and intelligence equities shepherded through the JFRP processes, ensuring full transparency into the execution of the ICCR and JFRP processes and supported activities of interest to the national and the military intelligence programs (reference (d)). Additionally, the J-2, J-8, and OUSW(I&S) are full participants in the ICCR process and members of the ICCR Council, thereby ensuring a DoW voice in Title 50/NIP-funded capability development.



Figure 6. ICCR Staffing Process

4. Mission Engineering Integration Activity Integration

a. The MEIA will execute mission engineering analytic efforts to shape and refine the problem, assess joint mission architectures, inform capability design and development requirements, and evaluate capability solutions to address the prioritized JOPs.

b. The MEIA will communicate JOPs to industry, collaborate with industry on solutions, and identify and accelerate integration of technologies from industry aligned to Joint Force needs.

c. The MEIA will leverage Military Services, Joint Staff, and OSW prototyping activities, as required, to mature capabilities and explore the viability of commercially available technologies to address the JOPs.

d. The MEIA will conduct structured and iterative experimentation campaigns, in collaboration with the Services and CCMDs, to demonstrate, test, and validate potential solutions in operational environments and collect warfighter feedback to inform capability maturation.

e. The MEIA accelerates capability delivery through system-of-systems integration and interoperability activities to ensure successful transition and fielding of solutions to the Joint Force.

f. The MEIA will provide recommendations of validated solutions, backed by analysis and experimentation results, to the RRAB to obtain timely resource allocations from the JAR. MEIA findings will be shared with the JROC to inform JFDD and JCI.

g. Additional information will be available in the MEIA Charter to be signed by DepSecWar, and the MEIA implementation plan to be signed by the USW(R&E) and USW(A&S).

5. Resourcing Integration

a. The JROC impacts resourcing both indirectly and directly. Multiple indirect resourcing pathways exist for the JROC, including: the CPR, the JROC Chair's participation in the DMAG, and PBR Issue Teams and Issue Nominations. Component requirements generation and resourcing advocacy will simultaneously continue through standard processes and decision fora. However, with the creation of the RRAB, the highest priority JROC business can now directly integrate with the resourcing process.

b. The RRAB was established to promote greater integration between requirements determination and resource prioritization to ensure budgeting decisions are focused on the most critical needs and can deliver an integrated and effective Joint Force. The RRAB serves as the DoW's single decision forum for aligning fiscal resources to the Joint Force's most pressing joint operational problems, presented as a ranked list of JOPs, synchronized with the annual PBR process. The RRAB compares and unites military/operational analysis with resource-informed analysis to drive resourcing decisions and decisive action.

c. Each budget cycle, the RRAB will select topics from the top-ranked JOP and nominations from the co-chairs to perform analysis, issue programming guidance, and recommend allocation of funding from the JAR. The JROC identifies and ranks the top JOPs based on strategic guidance, warfighting concepts, CCMD inputs, threat analysis, as well as ongoing JFDD activities. Through the CPM process, the RRAB will receive recommendations to address selected JOPs through a combined analysis conducted by Joint Staff, OUSW(A&S), OUSW(R&E), OSW(CAPE), CCMDs, and the Services.

d. The RRAB will issue a Deputy Secretary of War (DepSecWar) decision memo, which can direct program starts, realignments, terminations, other changes and proposed JAR allocations as an input to the PBR process. Unless otherwise directed by DepSecWar, joint decisions will transition directly into the budget build without additional review layers.

e. Additional information will be available in the RRAB Charter to be signed by the DepSecWar.

6. Allies and Partners Integration

a. International Joint Requirements Oversight Council

(1) Due to rapid pace with which our adversaries are advancing technologically and doctrinally, the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom realized that a paradigm shift in our approach to the development of military requirements was necessary. In 2022, the International Joint Requirements Oversight Council (I-JROC) was created to ensure A&P were central to developing requirements for shared national strategic objectives. The I-JROC is intended to create shared requirements and development of capabilities while ensuring interoperability and maintaining our capability advantage against current and emerging threats. In 2025, the I-JROC was expanded to include Canada and New Zealand. Deliberate and dedicated investment towards transparent and enduring relationships with A&P will ultimately secure our strategic objectives, and the inclusion of our partners within an I-JROC provides the lasting foundation for accelerated delivery of advanced warfighting capabilities and future force interoperability.

(2) FCBs will analyze and assess the value of including A&P within their capability portfolios during CPMRs. Liaison officers from I-JROC member nations will assist with identifying specific areas for collaboration. In support of international cooperation efforts, requirements sponsors should utilize classifications that facilitate international information coordination to the

maximum extent possible and utilize separate attachments for non-releasable information.

(3) As capabilities are identified that meet a combined gap, they will be processed by the I-JROC Secretariat IAW the I-JROC Charter. Based on the maturity of the requirement, it will be provided to the Building Partnerships WG, which will examine it for international suitability and refinement in preparation for the International Concepts and Capabilities Board (ICCB).

(4) The I-JROC is held twice per year, consists of the Vice Chiefs of Defense of the FVEY nations, and is chaired by the VCJCS. The I-JROC validates combined requirements that are driven by concept and capability gaps.

(5) The ICCB is a 3-star–level board with representation from each of the FVEY countries, chaired by DJ-8. The ICCB typically meets 2–3 times before each I-JROC to provide FVEY-level direction, guidance, and refinement of requirements proposed to the I-JROC.



Figure 7. I-JROC Organization Chart

b. Exportability. Addressing exportability throughout the requirements and acquisition process is an essential element for ensuring A&P integration. Exportability also incentivizes industry to maintain a more robust industrial base through higher capacity demand for military articles. However, improved

allied integration and industrial base robustness must be balanced by the need to ensure our technological advantages are protected, including, but not limited to, information sharing and Foreign Military Sales. Exportability has been directed by numerous sources, including:

(1) Reference (mm), which states the SecWar shall "secure exportability as a requirement in the early stages of the acquisition process."

(2) Section 3C(4) of reference (nn), which states, "PMs will integrate international acquisition and exportability planning into the program's acquisition strategy beginning at the entry milestone and continuing through all phases of the acquisition process."

(3) Reference (oo), which states "allied/partner interoperability and coalition use" will be incorporated into relevant requirements documents and the JROC encourages "the Services and components to begin incorporating exportability and allied/partner interoperability" into current and future requirements documents.

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ENCLOSURE F

REFERENCES

a. Title 10, U.S. Code, section 181, “Joint Requirements Oversight Council”

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d. ADNI/SRA and DJ-8 memo, 16 March 2010, “Guidelines for Interaction between the ICCR Process and JCIDS”

e. Greenwalt, Bill and Dan Patt, 10 February 2025, “Required to Fail | Beyond Documents: Accelerating Joint Advantage through Direct Resourcing and Experimentation,” <https://www.hudson.org/technology/required-fail-beyond-documents-accelerating-joint-advantage-through-direct-resourcing-dan-patt-william-greenwalt> last accessed 22 December 2025

f. 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 811: Modernizing the Department of Defense Requirements Process

g. CJCSI 3030.01B, 1 July 2025, “Implementing Joint Force Development and Design”

h. Title 10, U.S. Code, section 153, “Chairman: Functions”

i. DepSecDef memo, 4 December 2024, “Improved Capability Awareness Through Centralized Requirements Reporting”

j. Title 10, U.S. Code, section 167, “Unified Combatant Commands for Special Operations Forces”

k. USSOCOM 71-4, 22 January 2020, “Special Operations Forces Capabilities Integration and Development System”

l. Title 10, U.S. Code, section 167b, “Unified Combatant Commands for Special Cyber Operations”

m. Title 10, U.S. Code, section 4375, “Breach of Significant Cost Growth Threshold or Critical Cost Growth Threshold: Required Action”

n. Title 10, U.S. Code, section 4371-4377, "Cost Growth Definitions, Unit Cost Reports, and Cost Growth Breaches"

o. Title 10, U.S. Code, section 4376, "Breach of Critical Cost Growth Threshold: Reassessment of Program; Presumption of Program Termination"

p. DoDI 5205.13, 21 August 2021, "Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cybersecurity (CS) Activities"

q. DoDM 5200.01, 28 July 2020, "DoD Information Security Program: Protection of Classified Information"

r. Title 10 U.S. Code, section 163, "Role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff"

s. DoDI 5000.81, 31 December 2019, "Urgent Capability Acquisition"

t. DoDD 7045.20, 25 September 2023, "Capability Portfolio Management"

u. MOA between USD(R&E), USD(A&S), and the Chair of the JROC, 16 July 2024, "Capability Portfolio Management"

v. Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, 1 October 2023, *Department of Defense Mission Engineering Guide*

w. Joint Staff J-6, 19 December 2025, *The Joint Interoperability Branch Process Guide*

x. JROCM 034-23, 5 May 2023, "Refinement of the Joint Capability Area Taxonomy and Definitions"

y. DepSecDef memo, 5 May 2021, "Creating Data Advantage"

z. 2007 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 801: "Requirements Management Certification Training Program"

aa. DoDI 8330.01, 27 September 2022, "Interoperability of Information Technology"

bb. DoDI 8310.01, 7 April 2023, "Information Technology Standards in the DoD"

cc. Title 10 U.S. Code, section 4403, "Requirements Relating to the Availability of Major System Interfaces and Support for Modular Open System Approach"

dd. Title 10, U.S. Code, section 4211, "Acquisition Strategy"

ee. 2018 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 823: "Exemption from Design-Build Selection Procedure"

ff. Title 10, U.S. Code, section 4328, "Weapon System Design"

gg. 2009 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 332: "Consideration of Fuel Logistics Support Requirements in Planning, Requirements Development, and Acquisition Processes"

hh. Title 10, U.S. Code, section 2911, "Energy Policy of the Department of Defense"

ii. Title 10, U.S. Code, section 2926, "Operational Energy"

jj. 2005 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 141: "Development of Deployable Systems to Include Considerations of Force Protection in Asymmetric Threat Environments"

kk. 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 812: "Repeal of Certain Defense Acquisition Laws"

ll. JROCM 120-05, 13 June 2005, "Policy for Updating Capabilities Documents to Incorporate Force Protection and Survivability Key Performance Parameters"

mm. E.O. 14268, 9 April 2025, "Reforming Foreign Defense Sales to Improve Speed and Accountability"

nn. DoDI 5000.85, 4 November 2021, "Major Capability Acquisition"

oo. JROCM 025-19, 15 April 2019, "Conventional Arms Transfer Policy, National Security Presidential Memorandum Task 2.7, Build Exportability"

pp. ICD 115, 21 December 2012, "Intelligence Community Capability Requirements Process"

SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. DepSecWar memo, DRAFT, “Establishing the Mission Engineering and Integration Activity”

2. USW(R&E) and USW(A&S) memo, DRAFT, “Mission Engineering and Integration Activity Implementation Plan”

3. DepSecWar memo, DRAFT, “Charter of the Requirements and Resourcing Alignment Board”

GLOSSARY

PART I – ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

A&P	allies and partners
ACAT	Acquisition Category
ACCM	Alternative Compensatory Control Measures
ADNI	Assistant Director of National Intelligence
AI	artificial intelligence
AI2	Acquisition Integration and Interoperability
AO	action officer
AOU	Assessment of Operational Utility
APA	Additional Performance Attribute
C4/Cyber	command, control, communications, and computers/ cyber
CAPE	Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
CCDR	Combatant Commander
CCIDS	Cyber Capabilities Integration and Development System
CCMD	Combatant Command
CDO	Chief Data Officer
CDR	CCMD Derived Requirement
CGA	Capability Gap Assessment
CI	counterintelligence
CICA	Classified Information Compromise Assessments
CIDA	Cyber Incident Damage Assessments
CIP	Critical Intelligence Parameter
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CO	Cyberspace Operations
CONEMP	concept of employment
CONOPS	concept of operations
COTS	commercial-off-the-shelf
CPM	Capability Portfolio Management
CPMR	Capability Portfolio Management Review
CPR	Chairman's Program Recommendation
CRA	Chairman's Risk Assessment
CRC	Concept Requirement Capability
CRD	Capstone Requirements Document
CREB	Cyber Requirements Evaluation Board
CR	Capability Requirement
DAFA	Defense Agencies and Field Activities

DAMO	Damage Assessment Management Office
DAR	Damage Assessment Report
DAS	Defense Acquisition System
DCR	DOTmLPF-P Change Request
DDRA	Joint Staff J-8 Deputy Director for Resources and Acquisition
DDRCD	Joint Staff J-8 Deputy Director for Requirements and Capability Development
DepSecWar	Deputy Secretary of War
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DJ-8	Joint Staff Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment, J-8
DMAG	Deputy's Management Action Group
DNI	Director of National Intelligence
DOTmLPF-P	doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy
DoW	Department of War
DPS	Defense Planning Scenarios
FCB	Functional Capabilities Board
FDD	Force Development and Design
FO	flag officer
FVEY	Five Eyes countries (United States, Australia, Canada, Great Britain, New Zealand)
FY	fiscal year
FYDP	Future-Years Defense Program
GFM	Global Force Management
GO	general officer
GOTS	government-off-the-shelf
I-JROC	International Joint Requirements Oversight Council
IAPR	Integrated Acquisition Portfolio Review
IAW	in accordance with
IC	Intelligence Community
ICCB	International Concepts and Capabilities Board
ICCR	Intelligence Community Capability Requirements Process
IPL	Integrated Priority List
IPT	Integrated Process Team
IT	information technology
J-2	Joint Staff Directorate for Intelligence, J-2

J-4	Joint Staff Directorate for Logistics, J-4
J-5	Joint Staff Directorate for Strategy, Plans, and Policy, J-5
J-6	Joint Staff Directorate for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers/Cyber, J-6
J-8	Joint Staff Directorate for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment, J-8
JAR	Joint Acceleration Reserve
JCA	Joint Capability Area
JCB	Joint Capabilities Board
JCD	Joint Capabilities Division
JCI	Joint Capability Integration
JCIDS	Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
JCR	Joint Capability Requirement
JDCR	Joint DOTmLPF-P Change Request
JEON	Joint Emergent Operational Need
JFD	Joint Force Design
JFDD	Joint Force Development and Design
JFR	Joint Force Requirement
JFRP	Joint Force Requirements Process
JOP	Joint Operational Problem
JRAC	Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell
JSD	Joint Staffing Designator
JRC	Joint Requirements Coordinator
JROC	Joint Requirements Oversight Council
JROCM	Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum
JUON	Joint Urgent Operational Need
JWC	Joint Warfighting Concept
JWICS	Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
KM/DS	Knowledge Management/Decision Support
KOP	Key Operational Problem
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
KPP	Key Performance Parameter
KSA	Key System Attribute
MDA	Milestone Decision Authority
MDAP	Major Defense Acquisition Program
MEIA	Mission Engineering and Integration Activity
MFR	memorandum for record
ML	machine learning
MOE	measure of effectiveness
MOP	measure of performance

MRL	Manufacturing Readiness Level
M&S	modeling and simulation
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NDI	non-developmental item
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NIP	National Intelligence Program
NIPRNET	Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network
NLT	not later than
NMS	National Military Strategy
NSS	National Security Strategy
OCA	Original Classification Authority
OCR	office of collateral responsibility
OGE	On-Going-Effort
OPR	office of primary responsibility
OSW	Office of the Secretary of War
OUSW(A&S)	Office of the Under Secretary of War for Acquisition and Sustainment
OUSW(I&S)	Office of the Secretary of War for Intelligence and Security
OUSW(R&E)	Office of the Under Secretary of War for Research and Engineering
PBAD	Joint Staff J-8 Program and Budget Analysis Division
PBR	Program and Budget Review
PDM	Program Decision Memorandum
PM	program manager
POA&M	Plan of Action and Milestones
POC	point of contact
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
PPBE	Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
R2D2	Resourcing to Requirements Data Dashboard
RA	Recommended Action
R&E	Research and Engineering
RMCT	Requirements Management Certification Training
RRAB	Requirements and Resourcing Alignment Board
S&T	science and technology
SAP	Special Access Program
SAR	Special Access Required
SecWar	Secretary of War

SES	senior executive service
SIPRNET	SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SOCREB	Special Operations Command Requirements Evaluation Board
SOF	special operations forces
SOFCIDS	Special Operations Command Capabilities Integration and Development System
TMTR	Technology Modernization and Transition Review
TRL	Technological Readiness Level
TTPs	tactics, techniques, and procedures
UJT	Universal Joint Task
USCYBERCOM	U.S. Cyber Command
USSOCOM	U.S. Special Operations Command
VCJCS	Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
WAS	Warfighting Acquisition System
WAU	Warfighting Acquisition University
WG	working group

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capability. The ability to complete a task or execute a course of action under specified conditions and level of performance.

capability gap. The inability to meet or exceed a capability requirement, resulting in an associated operational risk until closed or mitigated. The gap may be the result of no fielded capability, lack of proficiency or sufficiency in a fielded capability solution, or the need to replace a fielded capability solution to prevent a future gap.

Capability Portfolio. A collection of grouped capabilities as structured by Joint Capability Areas and the associated doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities programs. (DoDD 7045.20)

Capability Portfolio Management. A continuous and persistent process that enables decision makers to manage resources and activities to maximize accomplishment of desired outcomes aligned to strategic priorities. Capability Portfolio Management incorporates the perspective of force sufficiency and suitability, acquisition and technology feasibility and sustainability, and budget affordability. Portfolio management accounts and weighs overall goals, timing, tolerance for risk, interdependencies, resource availability, and change in the environment over time to drive mission results and enhance operational capabilities within given constraints. Also called CPM.

Capability Requirement. Capability Requirements (CRs) are measures of effectiveness in the form of mission focused task statements written in "task, condition, standard" format in accordance with the Universal Joint Task List or equivalent Department of War component task list. CRs are "what needs to be done (the metric) and to what level (the initial value." If a CR is not satisfied by a capability solution, then there is an associated capability gap. Also called CR.

components. The Office of the Secretary of War, Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant Commands, Office of the Inspector General of the Department of War (DoW), DoW agencies, DoW field activities, and all other organizational entities in DoW. (DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms)

Capstone Requirements Document. A document capturing overarching joint capability requirements developed at the joint level and derived from joint concepts, joint operational problems, and joint force design through other Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) functions (i.e., Joint Force Design,

Joint Capability Integration, Combatant Command Requirements). The Capstone Requirements Document (CRD) captures the operational prioritization of the Capability Requirements within the capstone for iterative analysis under the Department of War's Capability Portfolio Management process. The collective group of CRDs represent the JROC's requirements portfolio. Also called CRD.

Concept Required Capability. Concepts identify required capabilities. These required capabilities are matched to current or programmed resources. If no resource exists that can match the capability, a gap exists. A process should then take place to fill that gap within the analytical framework. Also called CRC.

concept of operations. When used in the context of force design and development, applies operating concepts against specific scenarios to provide the basis for wargaming, modeling, experimentation, and assessment activities used to refine that operating concept, inform cost-benefit analysis, and ultimately support doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy decisions. Also called CONOPS.

concept of employment. Describes how a capability (e.g., an organization, platform, weapons system, forces, piece of equipment, or training facility) is intended to be used to perform a particular mission, task, or procedure. They are the most specific of all military concepts and contain a level of detail sufficient to inform the establishment of programmatic requirements and life cycle sustainment. Also called CONEMP.

contingency operation. A military operation that (a) is designated by the Secretary of War as an operation in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force; or (b) results in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty of members of the uniformed services under section 688, 12301(a), 12302, 12304, 12304a, 12305, or 12406 of Title 10; Chapter 13 of Title 10; section 3713 of Title 14; or any other provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress. (Title 10, U.S. Code, section 101)

Critical Intelligence Parameter. Threat capability or threshold established collaboratively by the requirements sponsor and the capability developer, changes to which could critically impact the effectiveness and survivability of the proposed system. Also called CIP. (DIEM Standard lli)

exportability. The process to identify, develop and integrate technology protection features into U.S. defense systems early in the acquisition process to protect Critical Program Information and other critical technologies/ capabilities and thus enables a system's export to partners. Technology protection primarily involves two tools: Anti-Tamper and differential capability modifications.

industry engagement. Early collaboration with commercial partners to refine operational problems and develop innovative solutions.

Integrated Priority List. A list of a Combatant Commander's highest priority requirements, prioritized across Service and functional lines, defining shortfalls in key programs that, in the judgment of the combatant commander, adversely affect the capability of the combatant commander's forces to accomplish their assigned mission. Also called IPL.

Intelligence Supportability. An assessment of the capability solution's intelligence support requirements and resources needed to enable each Joint Capability Requirement; it forms the basis for the inclusion of Intelligence support risks and issues within the eventual program's risk management processes.

interoperability. The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide data, information, materiel, and services to, and accept the same from, other systems, units, or forces, and to use the data, information, materiel, and services exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. Interoperability must be considered across multiple dimensions including technical (hardware, equipment, armaments, and systems), informational, procedural (doctrines and procedures), and human (terminology and training). (JP 6-0)

joint. Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms)

Joint Capability Requirement. Capability Requirements, including and especially capability requirements related to joint force integration and interoperability, that are critical or essential to address a specific Joint Operational Problem or Joint Force Development and Design. Also called JCR.

Joint Concepts. Identifies a current or future military challenge and proposes a solution to improve the ability of the Joint Force to address that military challenge. A joint concept may also propose new ways to employ the Joint

Force based on future technology. (DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, CJCSI 3010.02).

Joint Force Requirement. A capability required to satisfy the roles, functions, missions, or tasks of the Joint Force in support of current or future joint force operations. Also called JFR.

Joint Emergent Operational Need. Critical requirements that cannot be satisfied with the normal Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process. If unresolved, would result in critical mission failure of an anticipated contingency operation or the loss of life requiring additional forces to accomplish anticipated contingency operation mission objectives. Also called JEON.

joint function. A grouping of capabilities and activities that enable joint force commanders to synchronize, integrate, and direct joint operations. (JP 3-0)

Joint Military Capabilities. The collective capabilities across the joint force, including both joint and force-specific capabilities that are available to conduct military operations.

Joint Operational Problem. A challenge across the joint force in achieving an assigned military objective based on current doctrine, emerging threats, or future concepts; may include limitations in capabilities, capacity, resources, or the ability to effectively and efficiently coordinate across the joint force, with another Combatant Command, or among joint military capabilities. Also called JOP. (title 10, U.S. Code, section 181(b))

Joint Urgent Operational Need. Critical requirements that cannot be satisfied with the normal Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process. If unresolved, would result in critical mission failure of an ongoing contingency operation or the loss of life requiring additional forces to accomplish assigned contingency operation mission objectives. Also called JUON.

Materiel (Capability Solution). All items (including ships, tanks, self-propelled weapons, aircraft, etc., and related spares, repair parts, and support equipment, but excluding real property, installations, and utilities) necessary to equip, operate, maintain, and support military activities without distinction as to its application for administrative or combat purposes. See also equipment, personal property. (DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JP 4-0)

materiel (Capability Solution). The letter "m" in the acronym is usually lower case since Joint doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTmLPF-P) Change Requests do not advocate new materiel development, but rather advocate the identification of materiel items, systems, or equipment needed to support the required capability increased quantities, modifications, improvements, or alternate applications of existing materiel or the purchase of commercial off-the-shelf, government off-the-shelf, or non-development items. Sometimes referred to as "little m" materiel, the materiel DOTmLPF-P consideration is everything necessary to equip Department of War forces to operate effectively. Materiel includes ships, tanks, self-propelled weapons, aircraft, related spares, repair parts, and support equipment, but excludes real property, installations, and utilities.

Mission Engineering. An interdisciplinary process encompassing the entire technical effort to analyze, design, and integrate current and emerging operational needs and capabilities to achieve desired mission outcomes. Also called ME.

mission. The essential task or tasks, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for the action. (JP 3-0).

mission thread. A sequence of end-to-end mission tasks, activities, and events presented as a series of steps to achieve a mission.

non-materiel (Capability Solution). Changes to doctrine, organization, training, (fielded) materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and/or policy, implemented to satisfy one or more capability requirements (or needs) and reduce or eliminate one or more capability gaps, without the need to develop or purchase new materiel capability solutions. (DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JP 4-0)

on-going efforts. An on-going effort is a program or a project with the potential to mitigate risk, develop a new capability solution, or improve an existing solution to satisfy a capability requirement. Also called OGE.

requirements sponsor. The organization submitting a requirements document.

Recommended Actions. A Recommended Action (RA) is a recommendation set forth by the FCB with the intent of avoidance, reduction, transfer, or acceptance of the risk(s) associated with a Joint Force gap within the relevant portfolio. RAs may include the establishment of new programs or projects; changes to existing on-going efforts; or doctrine, organization, training,

materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy change recommendations for Joint Requirements Oversight Council review and endorsement. Also called RA.

task. A clearly defined action or activity specifically assigned by an appropriate authority to an individual or organization, or derived during mission analysis, that must be accomplished. (JP 1, Vol 1).

Threat Approval. The sponsor's attestation that a capability requirement was informed by authoritative intelligence assessments and data from the Defense Intelligence Enterprise, and that this threat intelligence was aligned with the capability requirement's expected operational timeframe and conceptual employment. Threat Approval will be accomplished by the sponsoring Service's Senior Intelligence Center. In the case of "FCB Interest" and above capability requirements, the Defense Intelligence Agency reviews the Service-level Threat Approval.

weapon system. A combination of one or more weapons with all related equipment, material, services, personnel, and means of delivery and deployment (if applicable) required for self-sufficiency.

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